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The efficiency and success of U.S. security initiatives in Latin America requires a thorough 
understanding of resource conflict and the state’s role in managing it. International investments 
in mining and hydrocarbons in the Central Andes could potentially affect U.S. economic 
influence in those countries and have real implications for U.S. security presence relative to other 
world powers. Resource conflict makes it hard for the U.S. government to monitor extraction and 
production of strategic materials that are critical for the U.S. government to meet its defense 
needs and to achieve a favorable balance of power vis-à-vis other world powers through control 
over these commodities.  
This report examines how the regulations that structure the process of local community 
consultation affect the mining sector in Peru and the hydrocarbon extraction sector in Bolivia. By 
identifying commonalities in resource conflicts and analyzing how subnational institutions can 
predict the condition under which conflict arises, this research serves as a first stage in 
predicting, preempting, and resolving conflict more effectively. The findings in this report 
should matter to those concerned with the mechanisms by which new projects are reviewed and 
approved, including the degree to which a project’s environmental and social impacts are 
anticipated and evaluated.  
In Peru, participation is limited to the procedural level; communities can voice criticism 
but lack authority to halt a project within the structure of those procedures. At the other extreme, 
Bolivian lowland communities are granted a high degree of input in new hydrocarbon projects; 
their legitimate leaders must approve projects in writing in order for companies to obtain the 
necessary licenses from the environment ministry.  
This report observes, paradoxically, that the more inclusive framework in Bolivia has led 
to a free ride for projects on the technical front: in the Bolivian hydrocarbon cases analyzed here, 
conflict has revolved around achieving dialogue with the state and companies and obtaining 
appropriate compensation for projects. In contrast, what initially appears to be an easier road for 
companies has actually triggered more oversight on the technical front in Peru. For Peru, the 
analysis has shown how the Environmental Impact Assessment has become a highly political 
process in which subnational actors prove critical in developing and approving the EIA and 
ultimately the mining project, in spite of regulations that formally limit local participation to 
empty procedures. Mining conflict has escalated to the point of triggering outside oversight and 
sometimes the cancellation of projects, stemming from community complaints about technical 





Latin America, particularly the Central Andes, has undergone a tremendous rise in protest 
activity surrounding the extractive industries since the 1990s, when liberal economic reforms 
were widely introduced in hydrocarbons and mining. These mobilizations have had important 
implications for resource extraction and related policies, as well as for political stability more 
broadly. This report focuses on one critical element in the conflict story: formal and informal 
institutions that influence behavior in zones of extraction for proposed projects that have yet to 
be developed.  
The Central Andes, rich in hydrocarbons and minerals, has communities that face a 
tension between pushing back against new extractive projects, on one hand, and benefitting from 
resource extraction via direct investment as well as the distribution of royalties. Why then do 
some resource conflicts trigger oversight of technical aspects of new extractive projects, while in 
other cases conflict remains focused on questions of compensation? This report, part of a broader 
study on resource conflict in the Central Andes, addresses the effects of the formal and informal 
subnational institutions that structure community participation in the approval process for new 
mining and hydrocarbons projects. In particular, the report focuses on Peru’s mining sector and 
Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector.  
The analysis finds that in both countries, regulations introduced in the two sectors have 
had varied effects on resource conflict and the resulting oversight (or lack thereof) of projects’ 
technical elements. Peru’s regulatory environment stands out for granting only minimal 
participation to communities in zones of extraction. In Peru, participation has been limited to the 
procedural level, particularly regarding environmental impact assessments (EIAs): communities 
in the zone of extraction are able to voice their opinions about assessments but do not have the 
authority to halt a project within the structure of those procedures. By regulation, it is the state 
that is to ensure that these procedures are carried out, and only after they are completed can the 
EIA be approved and the new project be carried out.  
Bolivia sits at the other extreme, with regulations that are more accommodating of the 
communities in Bolivia’s hydrocarbon-rich lowlands. Bolivian lowland communities are granted 
a high degree of input in new hydrocarbon projects; their legitimate leaders must approve 
projects, in writing, in order for companies to obtain the necessary licenses from the environment 
ministry.2 In short, in Peru a company needs merely to demonstrate that they held meetings that 
permitted communities to contribute their opinions; in Bolivia, meanwhile, communities must 
actively approve the project before it can move forward. 
                                                
1 I am grateful to the individuals in Bolivia and Peru who helped me with this report by generously sharing with me 
their time and views. Diana Wueger and Judith Tulkoff provided exceptional support at the editing stage. 
2 The ministries responsible for environmental issues have changed over time; in order to avoid confusion, I’ve 




These different institutions have had implications for the shape of conflict in the two 
countries, and ultimately the degree to which technical elements of projects have undergone real 
oversight. In Peru, companies and the state have proven willing to fulfill the regulatory 
requirements, which do not, on their face, present obstacles to project approvals. Yet despite the 
formal emptiness of subnational participation, communities have used those procedures to effect 
real substantive outcomes, including more stringent review of the EIA, changes in EIAs, and the 
halting and even cancellation of projects. Specifically, groups have protested to stop the required 
procedures and therefore stall projects.  
In contrast, companies in Bolivia view the consultation process (consulta previa, or 
consulta) as a major impediment. This is especially true of Bolivia’s public companies, which 
are not accustomed to consulting with communities prior to initiating new projects. Threatened 
by the consultation process, companies have sought to sidestep the procedures altogether by 
claiming that projects are not located on indigenous territory, that the type of project places it 
outside the purview of the regulations, and/or by simply disregarding the regulations and moving 
forward with the project. Conflict in Bolivia thus has not been about halting the procedures to 
spur substantive oversight of projects, but about ensuring the procedures are followed in the first 
place. Once the consultation process is underway, the remainder of conflict is generally limited 
to discussions—often stretching out over months—within the structure of the consulta process, 
in part because the regulations grant substantive power to decisions made within the framework, 
making the process the legitimate forum for debating all dimensions of projects. Additionally, 
that communities have had to fight to ensure that the consulta is even conducted seems to have 
given them incentive to work within the consulta process. The discussions themselves focus on 
compensation for the projects’ unquantifiable impacts on the environment and cultural practices, 
as communities do not have access to sufficient technical expertise to analyze technical 
dimensions of the projects. Paradoxically, then, the much more robust framework for respecting 
the interests of groups in the zone of extraction in Bolivia has resulted in less scrutiny of the 
actual effects and plans of new projects than in Peru, where groups have been able to use 
procedural structures to kick projects up to levels where they have faced real scrutiny. 
Added to this institutional variable—whether regulations grant communities a substantive 
or merely procedural role in project approvals—a structural factor also helps to explain why 
discussions in the consultation process in Bolivia have focused on compensation and not on 
technical aspects of projects as they do in Peru. A key structural characteristic of mining in Peru 
has proven important in Peru’s mining conflict: the massive use of water in the mineral 
extraction process, which has an obvious impact on surrounding communities. In the cases 
analyzed here, there have been clear potential adjustments to projects that would reduce the 
degree to which communities’ water sources were threatened, including the construction of 




mobilize around a technical issue—in spite of limited technical expertise—with the possibility of 
changing the project itself while still receiving the benefits of the investment in their zone that 
would come with the mining project, both directly from mining companies and in the form of 
royalties. Importantly, though initially protest may not be entirely “anti-mining,” as conflict has 
escalated, at times the ultimate stance of communities has been to oppose the mining projects 
altogether, irrespective of technical alterations. 
In contrast, there have been no technical aspects of the Bolivian projects examined here 
that have stood out as both a single central focus of complaint and also potentially avoidable. 
Because of this, major conflict around technical aspects of projects has been essentially 
precluded in the consultation process. 
This report is based on interviews conducted during March 2012 in Lima, Peru, and 
during August and September 2012, in La Paz, and Santa Cruz, Bolivia (see Appendix), 
supplemented by newspaper articles, secondary sources, and laws and regulations. 
 
I. RESOURCE CONFLICT IN THE CENTRAL ANDES AND U.S. 
SECURITY INTERESTS 
By identifying regularities in resource conflict and analyzing how subnational institutions can 
predict the conditions under which conflict arises, this research serves as a first stage in 
predicting, preempting, and resolving conflict more effectively. There are numerous reasons why 
these goals are worthwhile, in general and for a U.S. security policy audience.  
Theoretically, the report demonstrates how formal institutions can produce outcomes that 
are not anticipated by their creators or by actors engaged in the conflict. Perhaps more 
fundamentally, the report’s findings should matter to those concerned with the mechanisms by 
which new projects are reviewed and approved, including the degree to which projects’ 
environmental and social impacts are anticipated and evaluated, as well as the extent to which 
that review is technical as opposed to political and participatory.  
Given the major role of mineral extraction in Central Andean economies, resource 
conflict—particularly at the project approval stage—has significant implications. Subnational 
opposition can halt a project for a new mine, a new gas plant or pipeline, or the expansion of an 
existing operation. In contrast, popular opposition is unlikely to shut down an ongoing 
operation.3 Conflict over hydrocarbons and mining is significant in Latin America, especially in 
the Central Andes, which relies heavily on revenue from mining and hydrocarbons exports. 
Groups mobilize to oppose the environmental and social effects of hydrocarbons and mining 
                                                
3 According to a mining consultant, the only exception to this trend is the 2009 shutdown of the longstanding La 
Oroya smelter in the department of Junín (run by Doe Run). Maiah Jaskoski, interview, Lima, Peru, March 23, 2012. 
On the shutdown see Patricia Velez, “Update 2—Doe Run: Peru Creditors Reject Restructuring Plan,” Reuters, U.S. 




extraction, to alter the percentage of royalties the state captures from private companies involved 
in production and transport, and to effect how royalties are distributed. In extractive zones, 
indigenous activism is particularly salient. The Central Andean countries have large indigenous 
populations, which maintain significant presence in resource-rich zones. Over the past two 
decades these groups have been increasingly organized and active, presenting demands through 
formal channels, such as political party formation, and through direct action, primarily protest 
activity. Resource-related conflict has become so intense that it has paralyzed the industries, 
triggered increased state control over these sectors, heightened antagonism between resource-
rich regions and the central government, and led to the early removal of sitting presidents.  
With regard to U.S. security interests, resource conflict and the state’s role in managing it 
can influence the efficiency and success of U.S. security initiatives in Latin America.4 First, if a 
country’s police or military forces are focused on security for extractive industries, U.S. support 
intended for antinarcotics and counterterrorism operations is often diverted toward security for 
mining or hydrocarbon operations. A glance at the Ecuadorian case is telling. The Ecuadorian 
armed forces, especially the army, play a key role in controlling local and regional protests 
surrounding the oil sector. The army’s focus on oil security has meant that logistical support 
from the U.S. to the Ecuadorian armed forces intended for antinarcotics and border security has 
been channeled toward oil security work.5 Second, less directly, resource conflict that triggers 
political instability can affect U.S. relations with Andean governments and therefore the ability 
of the U.S. government to pursue its counterterrorism and antinarcotics efforts in the region.  
Third, resource conflict could crowd out U.S. presence, including security presence, in 
Latin America. Understanding conflict and how to control it can help us anticipate the rise and 
fall of international influence in the Central Andes wielded by other world powers. Not only do 
these international investments in mining and hydrocarbons in the Central Andes potentially 
affect U.S. economic influence in those countries, they also have implications for U.S. security 
presence relative to that of other world powers. Public and private companies from many 
different countries invest in resource extraction, and with greater resource conflict comes greater 
investment in security by foreign companies and governments. Fourth and finally, looking ahead, 
conflict makes it hard for the U.S. government to monitor extraction and production of strategic 
materials that are critical for the United States to meet its defense needs and to achieve a 
favorable balance of power vis-à-vis other world powers through control over these 
commodities. In sum, given the importance to U.S. interests in controlling conflict and 
                                                
4 For a fuller discussion of linkages between resource conflict and U.S. security interests, see Maiah Jaskoski, 
Resource Conflicts: Emerging Struggles over Strategic Commodities in Latin America, (Monterey, CA: U.S. Naval 
Postgraduate School Center on Contemporary Conflict, 2011).  
5 Maiah Jaskoski, “Public Security Forces with Private Funding: Local Army Entrepreneurship in Peru and 




monitoring the production of hydrocarbons and minerals in the Central Andes, it is critical to 
understand the logic behind conflict, conflict escalation, and conflict resolution in those sectors.  
 
II. HYDROCARBONS AND MINING IN PERU AND BOLIVIA: AN 
OVERVIEW 
A comparison of Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector and the Peruvian mining industry is valuable for 
gaining a better understanding of the regional politics of project approvals in extractive 
industries. In terms of export revenue, mining and hydrocarbons are the most important sectors 
in Peru and Bolivia, respectively. Yet these sectors have gone in different directions with regard 
to private-sector influence. In Bolivia, as elsewhere in Latin America, state-owned companies 
have continued to play a major role—and in several places, an increasing role—in resource 
extraction. Bolivia’s trend toward greater state control of the sector permits us to analyze 
dynamics between state companies and communities.  
 Both countries have seen alternations between liberal and state-led economic models, 
including in extractive industries. In Peru, General Juan Velasco Alvarado’s government (1968–
75) nationalized much of Peru’s oil and mining sectors.6 The next major shift in the mining 
sector occurred in the aftermath of the crisis-ridden 1980s, which saw hyperinflation, negative 
growth, and the high point of a brutal, internal conflict that left an estimated 70,000 dead by the 
end of the 1990s.7  
Amid Peru’s economic crisis, President Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) pursued drastic 
privatization policies. By 1994, mining and petroleum had been privatized, largely through the 
piecemeal sale of shares.8 Since Fujimori left office in 2000, the government has continued 
welcoming foreign private investment; within his first two years in office, President Alan García 
(2006–2011) passed 99 decrees to break up community land and thereby encourage private 
investment in natural resource exploitation.9 More recently, President Ollanta Humala (2011–
present) was elected with support from the left, which has opposed catering to private mining 
companies;10 nevertheless, his government has generally supported the corporate side in mining 
conflicts, including the Conga case analyzed in this report.  
                                                
6 Luara Guasti, “The Peruvian Military Government and the International Corporations,” in The Peruvian 
Experiment Reconsidered, ed. Cynthia McClintock and Abraham F. Lowenthal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1983), 187–192. 
7 Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Informe final (Lima: CVR, 2003), Compendio estadístico, 86. 
8 Jeffrey Bury, “Mining Mountains: Neoliberalism, Land Tenure, Livelihoods, and the New Peruvian Mining 
Industry in Cajamarca,” Environment and Planning 37 (2005): 221–239. 
9 Anthony Bebbington, “The New Extraction: Rewriting the Political Ecology of the Andes?” NACLA Report on the 
Americas (September/October: NACLA, 2009), 12. 




With central government support, investment in mining in the 1990s skyrocketed. 
Between 1990 and 1997, mineral exploration in Peru increased by 2000 percent.11 The number of 
mining claims made annually rose from under 1,000 in 2001 to nearly 8,000 in 2007, and the 
area of those claims increased during that same period from under 500 hectares to 3,500 
hectares.12 Expansion in mining has taken place in both longstanding mining departments such as 
Cajamarca, as well as departments new to mining, including Piura.13 
For its part, Bolivia is home to the largest natural gas reserves in Latin America.14 In 
2007, state revenues from hydrocarbons totaled $2.15 billion, 47 percent of the government’s 
total revenue.15 Under Bolivia’s neoliberal economic model, initiated in 1985, two major reforms 
passed under President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (1993–97) encouraged private investment in 
Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector in the 1990s: capitalization of the state oil company Yacimientos 
Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) and the Hydrocarbons Law. Under the new regime, 50 
percent of YPFB was sold off to multinational corporations,16 and transnational royalties to the 
state were cut from 50 to 18 percent in “new discovery sites.”17 As of 2002, 97 percent of 
Bolivian hydrocarbon reserves were located in new discovery sites, which meant that the state 
received a relatively small share of the profits from production.18 
In 2006, the government—headed by Bolivia’s first indigenous president, Evo Morales 
(2006–present), at the head of the social-movement-turned-multi-sectoral political party 
                                                
11 Anthony Bebbington, “Extractive Industries and Stunted States: Conflict, Responsibility and Institutional Change 
in the Andes,” Corporate Social Responsibility: Comparative Critiques, ed. K. Ravi Raman and Ronnie D. 
Lipschutz (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
12 Ibid., 309. 
13 Ibid., 310. 
14 Argentina is second, with 30 percent less, according to Allyson Benton, referencing British Petroleum data. 
Allyson Benton, “Political Institutions, Hydrocarbons Resources, and Economic Policy Divergence in Latin 
America,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (Boston, MA: 
August 28–31, 2008), Table 2.  
15 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Country Profile Select; Bolivia; Demographics and Resources: Natural Resources,” 
(June 17, 2008). 
16 Derrick Hindery, “Social and Environmental Impacts of World Bank/IMF-Funded Economic Restructuring in 
Bolivia: An Analysis of Enron and Shell’s Hydrocarbons Projects,” Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 25, 
no. 2 (2004): 281–282.  
17 Ibid., 292.  
18 Hindery,“Social and Environmental Impacts,” 292. The 1996 hydrocarbon law redefined “new” and “extant” 
natural gas fields in such a way that the very high percentage of hydrocarbons was located in the new sites, therefore 
enabling transnational companies to avoid significant royalty payments. Susan Spronk and Jefferey R. Webber, 
“Struggles against Accumulation by Dispossession in Bolivia: The Political Economy of Natural Resource 
Contention,” Latin American Perspectives 34, no. 2 (March 2007), 34. Concretely, as described by a YPFB official 
(Maiah Jaskoski, interview, Santa Cruz, Bolivia, September 5, 2012) and an economist at the think tank CEDLA 
(Maiah Jaskoski, interview, La Paz, Bolivia, August 28, 2012), in fact these were not new discoveries at all: there 
were known to have existed, but the Bolivian state lacked paperwork to officially declare them or certify them as 
proven gas reserves. As I was told, the 18 percent rate was established specifically to appease the Brazilian company 
Petrobras, to facilitate the existing arrangement by which Brazil is committed to purchase a set percentage of 




Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS)19—shifted control of hydrocarbons back to the Bolivian state 
in important ways following the 2003 and 2005 “gas wars.” The 2003 protests involved 
indigenous peasants, miners, neighborhood associations, factory workers, students, and 
intellectuals demanding the re-nationalization of the country’s gas reserves. After four days of 
violent protests that resulted in more than 70 deaths, Sánchez de Lozada, then in his second 
presidency (2002–03), resigned from office.  
Carlos Mesa, Sánchez de Lozada’s Vice President and successor, also faced major 
protests in the western highland cities of El Alto, La Paz, and Cochabamba.20 In response to the 
hydrocarbon issue, Mesa sought unsuccessfully to satisfy demands for increased national 
involvement.21 He held a national referendum in July 2004 proposing, among other things, to 
renegotiate contracts with transnational companies to increase royalties and, specifically with 
regard to all future concessions, to increase royalties to at least 50 percent. The referendum 
approved the law, but many groups thought the project did not go far enough toward 
nationalization of the sector. Mesa resigned amid massive protests in March 2005. 
Under President Evo Morales, the May 1, 2006 “Heroes of the Chaco” decree 
nationalized gas reserves, forcing oil and gas firms operating in Bolivia to turn over their 
production to YPFB; and increased the tax rate on the largest gas deposits to 82 percent.22 
Smaller gas and oil fields would be taxed at a rate of 50 percent. Private firms had 180 days to 
sign new contracts. The renegotiation process was successful in terms of continuity in gas 
production; Repsol-YPF and Petrobras, which together controlled over 70 percent of Bolivia’s 
hydrocarbon production, both accepted the new terms. Importantly, though Morales led and rose 
with the support of an indigenous movement, he is equally as “developmentalist” as prior, right-
wing presidents. In fact, though the Morales government has maintained the support of Bolivia’s 
highland indigenous groups, it has faced substantial protest by lowland indigenous groups as a 
result of the expansion of hydrocarbon activities in the northern Amazon basin23 and government 
support of new projects in the gas-rich Chaco region in the eastern lowlands. In recent months, 
                                                
19 Raúl L Madrid, “The Rise of Ethnopopulism in Latin America,” World Politics 60 (April 2008): 475–508; and 
Raúl Madrid, “Bolivia: Origins and Policies of the Movimiento al Socialismo,” in The Resurgence of the Latin 
American Left, ed. Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M. Roberts (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2011): 239–259. 
20 This paragraph is based on the following source, in addition to other referenced sources: Nancy G. Postero, Now 
We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 213–
214. 
21 The 2005 protests did not stem solely from complaints over gas policy. For instance, some groups mobilized to 
oppose the privatization of water services in El Alto and La Paz, whereas others protested in defense of coca 
production. Thomas Perreault, “Natural Gas, Indigenous Mobilization and the Bolivian State: Identities, Conflict 
and Cohesion,” Programme Paper 12 (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2008), 15. 
22 This paragraph summarizes analysis in Perreault, “Natural Gas, Indigenous Mobilization, and the Bolivian State,” 
16–18. 
23 Anthony Bebbington, “The New Extraction,” 14. For instance, Petrobras and Petroandina have contracts to 
conduct exploration for gas in the Aguaragüe National Park, which is co-managed by a Guaraní indigenous 




conflict between the government and lowland indigenous groups has led the government to seek 
to divide the region-level indigenous movement in the lowlands (see below). 
The Peruvian mining and Bolivian hydrocarbon cases also present fertile ground for 
understanding how conflict is influenced by the tension between a community’s interests in (1) 
blocking or altering future extractive projects based on environmental and social consequences 
of those projects; and (2) resources and investment brought to the region through resource 
extraction.  
In both cases, there has been ample pressure to protect communities’ livelihoods and thus 
challenge new projects altogether, or at least those elements of projects that appear most 
threatening to the environment or communities’ way of life. Yet these cases also offer some 
variation in terms of the types of communities located in Peruvian mining and Bolivian gas 
zones, their degree of organization, and thus their participation in the approval or blocking of 
new projects.  
As is clear from the trajectory of the rise of MAS to the presidency, Bolivian indigenous 
organization and mobilization in recent decades has been substantial, especially by the well-
known Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de 
Bolivia, CIDOB), the indigenous organization that encompasses lower-level organizations in 
Bolivia’s gas-rich, eastern lowlands, including the Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní (APG), which 
represents the lowland Guaraní indigenous population that resides in the Chaco.24 
As evidence of how critical the CIDOB is as a political actor in Bolivia, just one month 
prior to my travels to Bolivia, the government had initiated a major effort to divide the CIDOB in 
order to gain support in the lowlands. In the city of Santa Cruz, the CIDOB, headed by the 
organization’s elected president, had been removed from its central office and replaced by a 
parallel group that was aligned with the Morales government. According to a member of an APG 
technical team, at the time of the interview, four of the 13 organizations (regionales) that 
comprise the CIDOB had developed parallel, pro-Morales structures as well; the APG, renowned 
for its strong organizational linkages, had not.25  
In contrast to Bolivia, Peru historically has seen weak indigenous mobilization in spite of 
its large indigenous population. Indigenous mobilization in recent decades has been in the 
lowlands—most notably by the Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian 
Rainforest (Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana, AIDESEP)—not in the 
mineral-rich highlands. Instead, peasant (campesino) communities dominate in Peruvian mining 
zones; mining concessions affect over one-half of the country’s peasant communities.26 This 
                                                
24 On the rise of the CIDOB, see Deborah J. Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of 
Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
25 Maiah Jaskoski, interview, Santa Cruz, Bolivia, September 6, 2012. All indigenous group members interviewed 
for this study were in the original CIDOB and subordinate regionales. 




dynamic enables us to examine mining conflict where there is weaker organization among 
communities, as the Peruvian cases examined here do not involve a strong organizational 
structure comparable to the CIDOB that could unite groups across territory and provide 
resources during negotiations and conflicts. 
Weak organization in Peru has not translated into an absence of conflict in the mining 
sector, however. While total annual social protests in the country amounted to less than 400 
between 1994 and 1999, annual incidents approached 700 in 2000 and 2001 and surpassed 800 in 
2002.27 This conflict has primarily concerned Peru’s mining and hydrocarbon industries. 
According to the national ombudsman’s office’s (Defensoría del Pueblo, or Defensoría) record 
of “social conflict” in the country, conflicts between companies that exploit natural resources and 
communities made up 21 percent of all 110 conflicts (each of which could involve multiple 
protests) reported in 2006, and 46 percent of the 57 new social conflicts in 2007.28 During 
interviews conducted in Lima in 2006, a leader in the national mining, oil, and energy 
association and a private security official said that social protest was by far the greatest security 
concern for companies operating in the extractive industries. In March 2012, 72 percent of all 
active social conflicts registered in Peru by Defensoría were over natural resource issues.29 In 
short, in both countries we see the capacity—through different structures—for communities to 
mobilize against the government, national extraction policies, and companies. 
Yet while groups have some motivation to protest policies and new projects, there are 
also very real economic incentives in both countries for groups to support new investment in 
mining and hydrocarbon extraction. There are two main categories of such material benefits at 
the subnational level: the distribution of royalties and taxes to subnational governments, and 
direct company investments in the form of gifts or development assistance. A portion of royalties 
are directed to subnational levels in both Bolivia and Peru. Peru’s “mining canon” allocates 
mining royalties to subnational political jurisdictions—i.e., regions, provinces, and districts—
where mining operations are located.30 With a 2001 law, Law 27506, the canon increased from 
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20 to 50 percent of all company royalties.31 The canon has triggered conflict among subnational 
governments over their allotment as well as conflict between citizens and subnational 
governments that are ineffective in spending canon funds.32  
Since the 1940s, oil-rich departments in Bolivia have received more than other 
departments.33 Most importantly, as of 2010, the Bolivian department of Tarija produced more 
than 60 percent of the country’s natural gas and received 30 percent of Bolivia’s total royalties 
and direct hydrocarbons tax revenue.34 The direct hydrocarbons tax, or IDH, was created 
following the gas wars and increased the government’s share of gas profits. The IDH rate was 
increased under Morales.35 
Beyond the distribution of state royalties from resource extraction, resource-rich zones 
benefit from direct company investment in development and/or in funds created for the purposes 
of development and monitored by communities. The conflict cases in Bolivia that are assessed 
below provide examples of how these direct payoffs work. In Peru, while the main cases 
analyzed in this report involve conflict over technical elements of projects rather than over 
compensation from companies, it is worthwhile to provide one example of such a direct transfer 
of resources to communities. In one case, a development fund was set up by the Swiss mining 
company Xstrata to channel resources toward areas in the vicinity of the Las Bambas mining 
project in the department of Apurímac. The company used the fund as a way to dissuade 
opposition by actors outside the immediate zone of extraction, in combination with direct 
relations with the most local communities. The primary conflict in the area centered around the 
question of how the fondo de fideicomiso was to be spent, a conflict that played out between the 
regional government of the Apurímac department and the provinces of Grau and Cotabambas 
within Apurímac.36  
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A final, crucial characteristic is that detailed regulations governing subnational 
participation exist for both sectors in question. As we will see in the following section, the 
Bolivian regulations on “prior consultation” (consulta previa) encourage substantive input from 
communities on both the procedures of participation and the actual review of new project 
proposals. In contrast, subnational participation in Peru is structured according to a set 
procedural framework, and the regulations merely require community participation—not 
approval. Therefore, within Peru’s established structures, communities do not have the ability to 
block projects. 
 Stepping back, we see that the Bolivian case serves as a “most-likely” case,37 in that we 
expect to observe substantial community influence on the trajectory and content of projects in 
Bolivia. This is particularly true for the traditional gas zone of the Chaco, where the APG and the 
CIDOB are well-established and have support networks to provide information, expertise, and 
resources to mobilize large groups during resource conflicts. Furthermore, the Chaco 
communities enjoy broad authority over project content and project approval, due to the 
regulations governing the consulta previa. In contrast, Peru’s mining areas have much more 
obvious divisions—especially between local communities in the immediate zone of extraction 
and “supracommunal” groups in the broader area. The latter groups are less affected by projects 
and also less targeted by companies seeking to buy off groups. Furthermore, Peru’s regulatory 
structure provides only very limited participatory rights to communities in mining zones.  
Contrary to what these scenarios would predict, conflict in Peru has led to substantive 
revisions and even the halting of projects. Meanwhile, in Bolivia, conflict has remained merely 
about introducing procedures and gaining compensation from new projects, and conflict does not 
lead to substantial adjustments to new project proposals.  
 
III. VARIED INSTITUTIONS GOVERNING SUBNATIONAL 
PARTICIPATION IN PROJECT APPROVALS 
Specific regulations in Bolivia are sectoral but grounded in the concept of the consulta previa, 
which grants substantive decision-making powers to original communities residing in resource-
rich areas regarding what extraction takes place in their territories; a 2007 presidential decree 
gave indigenous and peasant communities the opportunity to participate in decisions surrounding 
resource extraction. In contrast, in Peru, “the rules governing the granting of concessions… do 
not give communities the right of free, prior and informed consent to decide whether mineral 
exploration and extraction should proceed beneath the lands that they own.”38 Instead, the 
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regulations governing participation in Peru’s mining sector have been incorporated into the EIA 
approval process for new projects, specific moment in the project approval process. Furthermore, 
and critically, regulations grant Peruvian communities only the right to participate in the EIA 
process, but not the right to affect the substance of the EIA or project approval. 
This section describes and compares these two regulatory frameworks and provides 
background on two characteristics of those contrasting structures. The analysis helps us to 
understand why participation in both cases has been defined at the sectoral level, rather than 
under a more general regulatory framework applicable to new development projects. The 
discussion also examines the conditions that would encourage participation in Peru to be situated 
specifically within the process of reviewing the environmental impact assessment, whereas in 
Bolivia participation has been conceived within the broad international norm of the consulta 
previa.  
In both countries there have been major efforts made toward establishing regulations that 
grant traditional communities in zones of extraction the right to the consulta previa. In Bolivia, 
the project is ongoing, and in Peru, the law and regulations were established during 2011–12 and 
have not yet been tested. There has been increasing international recognition that people residing 
in resource-rich territories have the right to be consulted or at least notified prior to new 
extractive projects in those spaces. This consciousness played a major role in the creation of a 
variety of international regulatory structures, including the 1989 approval of Convention 
(Convenio) 169 of the International Labor Organization (ILO) under the United Nations and the 
2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, both of which delineate 
the rights of indigenous communities, including “prior consultation” (consulta previa) before 
new projects are developed (e.g., Convention 169, Article 6).  
Beyond these changing international norms, another international development worth 
noting but that has carried much less independent weight is the changing practices within 
international business communities in the extractive industries. Since the 1990s, international 
mining and oil companies themselves have come to accept the idea that they need a “social 
license”—i.e., positive relationships with and some kind of acceptance from local populations—
in order to be able to operate in any given area.39 Yet such acceptance has not been universal, nor 
has it been spurred by some cultural or institutional dynamic within the international business 
community. Rather, as discussed below, decisions by companies in both Peru and Bolivia to 
engage more with communities has been the result of direct pressures from the international 
financial community and especially from protest within the country.  
                                                
39 Bebbington and Bebbington, “Anatomy of a Regional Conflict,” 264; Bebbington and Bebbington, “Extraction, 
Territory, and Inequalities”; and Ximena Warnaars, “Why Be Poor When We Can Be Rich? Constructing 




Peru’s Formal EIA Process: Limited Subnational Participation 
In Peru, progress in developing specific procedures for the consulta previa has gone in fits and 
starts. Through the 1993 Legislative Resolution 26253, which took effect in early 1995, Peru’s 
legislature ratified Convention 169 of the ILO. In 2007, Peru was among the countries that voted 
in favor of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Yet it took a 
major 2009 conflict in Bagua, in Peru’s northern Amazonas department. In that case, 33 died 
during clashes between protesters and police, which prompted real progress toward a general law 
and accompanying regulations that would set in place procedures for a consulta.40 During the 
Bagua conflict, indigenous and other communities rose up in opposition to a package of decrees 
under former President Alan García that were meant to open up the Amazon to development, but 
which left aside the process of negotiation with indigenous communities.41  
The Bagua violence brought national attention to the issue of indigenous land rights. In 
2011, this increased awareness led to the passing of a consulta previa law (Ley 29785), which 
granted rights of consultation to indigenous communities and triggered an intense political 
debate regarding how much power the consulta would give to traditional communities and what 
types of communities would qualify to have the right of consultation.42 The regulations of that 
law, approved in mid-2012 by Supreme Decree 001-2012-MC, gave specific timelines for 
beginning the consultation process and established a maximum of 120 days for the entire 
consulta process (Article 24). Critically, the state—not the communities—was granted the 
ultimate approval power (Article 23). The first consulta previa in Peru, in the hydrocarbon 
sector, is expected in early 2013.43 Because the regulations granted only indigenous groups with 
the right to be consulted (Article 7), and because historically communities residing in Peru’s 
mineral-rich highlands have identified and functioned as “campesino communities” without an 
indigenous affiliation, it seems unlikely that many communities confronting mining projects will 
be able to benefit from the new consulta previa legal structures. 
These new consulta previa regulations notwithstanding, community participation at the 
project approval stage in Peru has been defined primarily through regulations pertaining to 
environmental impact assessments (EIA), specifically within the mining sector.44 There are no 
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formal, built-in structures for popular participation in other parts of the approval process for 
mining projects,45 making the EIA particularly important for local communities. The EIA is an 
internationally established process in extractive industries intended to identify possible 
environmental and social impacts of alternative models for the project as well as plans to 
mitigate those impacts.46  
Formally, the EIA process in Peru is highly technical and centralized, with very limited, 
procedural participation built in at the most local level. The EIA requirement, as well as the 
responsibility of the energy and mining ministry to review the EIA, was instituted in the early 
1990s.47 The Dirección General de Asuntos Ambientales Mineros (DGAAM) within the energy 
and mining ministry is responsible for approving the EIA, a practice that many have criticized as 
evidence of state capture by mining companies; according to a long-time expert on social conflict 
in Peru and head of the Social Conflict Management Office of the Council of Ministers, 
beginning in 2004, the energy and mining ministry’s review of EIAs has been carried out by 
contracted third parties.48  
Some citizen participation has been introduced into the process since the 1990s, when 
increasing mining activity in Latin America triggered broader concern about companies’ 
obtaining a “social license” to operate from local communities.49 As a researcher specializing in 
mining and mining conflict explained during an interview, new regulations in the mid-1990s 
required that, once completed, the EIA be presented not only to the energy and mining ministry 
for evaluation, but also to the public at an audiencia pública (public meeting).50 Initially the 
audiencia was to be held in the energy and mining ministry offices in Lima. However, according 
to the researcher, subsequent resource conflict led the energy and mining ministry to require that 
affected communities participate in audiencias, which were relocated to the zone of extraction.51  
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In 2002, when decentralization in Peru was giving new voice to actors outside of Lima, 
an energy and mining ministry resolution (R.M. 596-2002-EM/DM) required that, in addition to 
the audiencia, informational talleres (workshops) be held before, during, and after the EIA’s 
completion in the area of extraction in order to present to the public the mining project’s 
environmental and social effects. During the thirty days following the audiencia, the public was 
also permitted to submit written comments about the project to the DGAAM, which was required 
to consider those documents when reviewing the EIA.  
According to an official from the Office of Environment, Public Services, and Indigenous 
Peoples of the Defensoría del Pueblo, the model of the talleres and audiencias was not fully 
implemented until 2008, when May regulations and a follow-up June resolution further specified 
guidelines for the process, again, specifically with regard to the mining sector.52 Indeed, the 2008 
energy and mining ministry regulations state that “notwithstanding the advances introduced in 
the Resolución Ministerial No. 596-2002-EM/DM with regard to citizen participation in the 
Energy and Mining Sector, currently it is necessary to have regulations specifically applicable to 
the mining subsector.”53 The new regulations describe citizen participation as a public process 
that seeks to provide information regarding mining projects, obtain and channel the population’s 
views, promote dialogue, build consensus, and incorporate the interests of affected populations 
when designing and executing mining projects.54 Like the 2002 resolution, the regulations 
identify talleres and audiencias among other mechanisms of citizen participation (Article 6). For 
its part, the 2008 resolution echoes the more general, 2002 resolution (Resolución Ministerial 
No. 304-2008-MEM/DM, El Peruano June 24, 2008).  
Though the 2008 regulations and resolutions provide space for public participation, 
especially in the most immediate area of extraction, this participation remains procedural from a 
legal standpoint. The 2008 decree explicitly denies populations the right to veto either mining 
operations or the decisions of the “designated authorities,”55 i.e., the DGAAM and the energy 
and mining ministry’s regional office, which answers directly to the ministry rather than to the 
elected regional president. Companies and the government are obligated to take communities’ 
feedback on project plans into account, but this can ultimately consist of explaining away 
complaints.  
Bolivia: Substantive Local Influence on the Fate of Projects 
As in Peru, participation in new project approval in Bolivia has been defined by sector-level 
regulations. However, unlike in Peru, those regulations have been framed not within the EIA 
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process but rather through the broader consulta previa concept, which has granted much more 
weight to community decisions surrounding new projects. 
There have been measures taken to develop a prior consultation framework that would 
apply to all sectors. In 1991, the Bolivian legislature passed Law 1257 ratifying the Convention 
169; based on this law, the constitution was revised in 1995 to incorporate reference to informed 
prior consent.56 Later, Bolivia became a signatory to the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, as well.  
Nevertheless, efforts to create a legal structure to apply the consulta systematically across 
sectors have been unsuccessful thus far, though they are still ongoing. Currently, the executive is 
leading a project to develop a general law on the consulta previa. Based on interviews with two 
members of the project team, the group was drawing on case knowledge from officials in the 
hydrocarbon ministry who had experience with the consulta previa process in that sector 
(discussed below).57 The project was being pursued amid a particularly tense moment for the 
consulta previa issue: the intense conflict over whether or not to construct a major highway 
through the protected forest, Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro-Sécure (TIPNIS), had 
become centrally about the specific consulta previa process that was established for that case.58 
Though the direction of a general consulta previa law and associated regulations is still in 
limbo in Bolivia, in the specific area of hydrocarbons, the consulta previa concept has been 
adopted and defined according to specific procedures. Unlike in the mining sector, where 
“between the period from 2003 to 2007 there was not political will to develop regulatory 
instruments to effectively permit the exercise of collective rights and especially the right of prior 
consent,”59 the process went farther in hydrocarbons.60  
Whereas in Peru the EIA regulations around community participation were developed in 
response to conflict on the ground, community agitation for the consulta previa in Bolivia was 
particularly effective because the hydrocarbon law was being rewritten anyway (see above 
discussion of the 2005 hydrocarbon law passed under President Carlos Mesa). The 2005 
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Hydrocarbon Law (3058) outlines in impressive detail the rights of indigenous and campesino 
communities residing in zones of extraction, including the right to prior, informed consent.61  
Bolivia’s regulations pertaining to the consulta previa in hydrocarbons, passed by the 
February 2007 Supreme Decree 29033, are noteworthy for granting indigenous communities and 
campesino communities in zones of extraction a substantive say in what projects can and cannot 
be developed in their territory, in addition to a role in establishing the timeline of and 
participants in the consulta process itself, evincing respect for local customs and authority 
structures, as discussed here.62 The overall consensus among subjects interviewed about both the 
2005 law, and its associated 2007 regulations on the consulta previa, was that indigenous groups 
were crucial in effecting the inclusion of the consulta in the new law as well as in developing the 
accompanying regulations. 
The regulations open by referencing Article 171 of the Constitution in providing for 
“social economic, and cultural rights of indigenous peoples,” and Law 1257 (based on Article 7 
of Convenio 169), for establishing the necessity of an evaluation of the social, spiritual, cultural, 
and environmental effects of development activities on indigenous peoples in order to carry out 
such activities. Subsequent sections of the regulations spell out the meanings of terms relevant to 
the consulta previa, including customs, territoriality, respect, prior information, participation, and 
representation.  
Though these definitions are certainly important, it is the description of the consulta 
procedures that makes evident a high regard for customs and the wishes of indigenous 
communities. The full consultation process is to be carried out with indigenous peoples at two 
phases in a new project’s implementation: prior to the granting of rights to conduct exploration 
activities, and before the approval of the EIA. As we will see below, this authority goes well 
beyond that granted to communities in Peru.  
Indigenous communities are legally obligated to participate in the consultation process—
that is, they cannot legally refuse to engage in discussions about new projects with the state—but 
do have a formal say in the timeline and structure of the meetings, which are to respect their 
customs and authorities. To initiate the consulta, the energy and mining ministry must submit in 
writing a proposal to hold an informative meeting about the project, which begins the process of 
the consultation. The ministry must send copies of the invitation to the indigenous communities’ 
regional, departmental, and national representatives. In addition, all of the public information 
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about the project must be enclosed (Article 10, Section a). The indigenous community then has 
seven calendar days to respond in writing to set a place and date for the meeting, which must be 
held within ten days of that response (Article 10, Section b). At that first meeting, the 
hydrocarbon ministry is to present more information about the project. The indigenous and/or 
campesinos communities must communicate to the ministry within ten calendar days after the 
meeting to present their written proposal for the consultation process, to include the timeframe 
and methodology of community activities, workshops, meetings, and assemblies, as well as the 
location of those events. The hydrocarbon ministry, in coordination with the communities and 
their upper-level officials, is to set a meeting in the area of influence of the project within seven 
days to analyze the proposal and any counterproposal of the ministry, to arrive at an agreement 
and sign an “acta de entendimiento” to guarantee the consulta process.  
The hydrocarbon consulta regulations grant indigenous communities a real voice in 
deciding whether or not any given project moves forward. The consultation process concludes 
with a signed document between the hydrocarbon ministry and the indigenous and campesino 
community representatives, which fulfills the requirement for “prior acceptance and express 
authorization of the original indigenous and peasant communities likely to be affected” (Article 
13). The consulta can be nullified if information about the project provided during the consulta is 
false, if the process deviates from the regulations or from the original written acta de 
entendimiento, or if the signing of the final agreement is carried out irregularly, for instance 
involving pressure, threats, or bribes (Article 18).  
IV. FINDINGS 
The following analysis of mining and hydrocarbon conflicts in Peru and Bolivia, respectively, 
will demonstrate that institutions, represented by regulations governing local participation in 
project approval, in conjunction with structural aspects of the project—specifically, the presence 
or absence of a technical problem to which there is an obvious solution— help explain the 
following: when we should see conflict, whether conflict is oriented toward technical aspects of 
projects or towards compensation from the effects of projects, and whether conflict leads to 
rigorous oversight of project designs.  
A key piece of the conflict story is established at the beginning: whether or not 
communities must protest in order to kickstart the participatory process. The procedural or 
substantive nature of the regulations, in conjunction with the public-private balance of control of 
the sector, influences the state’s decision whether or not to initiate the consultation process. In 
Peru, the strictly procedural nature of community participation in the EIA process means that the 
process is not, on its face, threatening to investment and extraction. Furthermore, with the private 
sector dominating mining, private companies are accustomed to some degree of consultation 




participatory process without the added inducement of community protest. In contrast, the 
substantive nature of the regulations in Bolivia in conjunction with the state’s dominant role in 
hydrocarbons means not only that the regulations threaten investment by creating the possibility 
for communities to block projects, but that the key actors include state companies (in 
partnerships with private companies). Historically, these state companies have not had the 
experience of consulting with communities, according to interview subjects describing the pre-
capitalization era in Bolivia. In Bolivia, therefore, companies seek to skirt the regulations by 
defining projects as being outside the purview of those regulations or by ignoring the consulta 
process altogether. Communities often respond with aggressive protests, setting the tone of the 
conflict and future negotiations. 
 
 
Figure 1: Institutions for Local Participation in Project Approval and Implications for 




There is also a structural element that influences the focus of conflict: the degree to 
which a project poses obvious environmental and social effects to communities and the extent to 
which there is a clear alternative project design that would prevent or offset those threats. When 
both pieces are present, communities are more likely to rally around a single issue, as 
communities face the conflicting pressures of enjoying the material benefits and investments 
from resource extraction and also defending their way of life, livelihood, and health. That is, 
communities can mobilize against the obvious technical problem knowing that, should the 
alternative option be chosen, the project can still go forward, generating both revenue and 
investment for the region and also causing less adverse implications for their way of life. 
In Peru, the divergence of massive volumes of water for mining projects has clear 
adverse consequences for people’s wellbeing and livelihoods. Furthermore, in the cases analyzed 
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community: constructing dams, reservoirs, and/or desalination plants. Communities have 
mobilized around technical aspects and demanded that an alternative, less-threatening option be 
chosen. Ultimately, however, protests that initially involved technical fixes to potentially 
lucrative projects for the region have escalated into protests against the project altogether. 
In contrast, though communities in Bolivia’s Chaco region are all too familiar with the 
adverse effects of gas exploration and extraction—including seismic explosions that ruin 
infrastructure and disturb wildlife and human activities; pipelines that pass through communities; 
and the seepage of gas into drinking water sources—there have been no obvious technical fixes 
that would ameliorate these threats.63 This structural characteristic of the projects, together with 
the necessity of community mobilization to start the consultation process in the first place, has 
helped to deter major protest around technical issues in gas projects in the Chaco. 
In Peru, where the purely procedural characteristics of the regulations leave communities 
powerless to block projects, protests instead have generated oversight of the project at higher 
levels. In contrast, Bolivian regulations grant communities a legitimate say in the future of 
projects, thus keeping discussions within the structure of the consultation process. Communities 
are thus limited to discussing matters about which they are experts in, and as they lack the 
expertise to delve into technical options in the EIA or to measure quantifiable project costs, they 
tend to focus on compensation for nonquantifiable project costs, such as potential impacts on 
their cultural practices and way of life. 
Paradoxically, then, the more inclusive framework in Bolivia has led to a free ride for 
projects on the technical front. In contrast, what initially appears to be an easier road for 
companies has actually triggered true technical oversight in Peru. 
V. PERU: SUBSTANTIVE EFFECTS OF PROCEDURAL 
PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 
In a context in which formal participation in the EIA process is informative and procedural and 
only involves residents living in the immediate area of extraction, scholars have criticized Peru’s 
EIA process for being highly technical and administratively centralized, even after participation 
was introduced into the process.64 In her research on Yanacocha’s expansion project in the mid-
2000s, Fabiana Li argues that mining companies control the existing participatory spaces and 
stifle the voice of communities by using their technical expertise to frame discussions of impacts 
and mitigation and taking advantage of talleres and audiencias to build support.65 Asymmetric 
                                                
63 This claim that no obvious fix exists is based on interviews with indigenous leaders, technical experts, and outside 
consultants who have supported indigenous groups in the Chaco in consultas and in direct negotiations with 
companies. 
64 De Echave et al., Minería y conflicto social, 40. 




power relations make it very difficult for communities to challenge elements of the EIA 
effectively within the structure of public meetings.66 
Consistent with Li, I find that companies have used EIA participatory spaces—i.e., 
talleres and audiencias—to sell communities on mining projects and to build positive community 
relations more broadly. This strategy is particularly effective because local groups lack the 
technical expertise required to effectively challenge EIA content when confronted with officials 
from mining companies or mining consultants. However, acknowledging the weak voice of 
participants during talleres and audiencias, I emphasize the dynamics surrounding these formal 
structures to explore how the framework for subnational procedural participation in fact can 
prove crucial in effecting substantive EIA outcomes.  
I focus on two key processes for effecting change to EIAs. First, local activists can take 
action. Though technical expertise for evaluating EIAs is scant at the local level, communities 
residing near mining projects are well aware of the fundamental adverse environmental impacts 
of mining operations based on prior exposure and observing the experiences of other 
communities. In these cases, local communities have demanded adjustments to company plans 
and have even mobilized to prevent the required audiencias from happening at all, thereby 
pausing the EIA process and reminding us that even highly procedural requirements presume a 
considerable degree of cooperation between communities and companies.67 In cases where 
talleres and audiencias take place without incident, groups excluded from the process may 
protest their exclusion by challenging the degree to which the subnational procedures of the EIA 
process were followed.  
In both cases, subnational groups have clear substantive as well as procedural complaints 
regarding the EIA. Once community-company conflict escalates to a certain level, company 
efforts to comply with the initial technical demands are often insufficient to resolve the tensions. 
National political leaders have responded to subnational mobilization by authorizing careful 
review of the EIAs. Such critical scrutiny—hardly standard in Peru, given the energy and mining 
ministry’s (Ministerio de Energía y Minas, MINEM) role in promoting mining investment—has 
interfered with projects. Thus subnational EIA evaluations can serve as a critical juncture, 
whereby dissatisfaction can lead to a national-level reexamination and even rejection of the EIA 
and the project. Additionally, the regional government can play a particularly important role; this 
report will examine one case in which the regional president brought together actors at the 
subnational level to revise the content of the EIA.  
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Actors and Processes 
The regional and local governments as well as “supracommunal” actors serve as the focus of this 
analysis on subnational EIA processes. Most obviously, the local communities in the “direct area 
of influence,” an area defined by the EIA, participate directly in the subnational EIA process. 
These are the communities identified as most critical both by the EIA and by mining companies, 
which historically have targeted those communities with gifts and land-purchasing plans, as 
made plain in De Echave et al.’s analysis of six well-known mining conflicts in Peru since the 
1990s.68 This focus on local spaces is logical if we consider companies’ immediate need to gain 
access to the land under which the minerals are located. In an interview, a mining company 
consultant who has worked in Peru since the 1980s recalled his work with the large Antamina 
copper mine in the northern department of Ancash in the late 1990s. He explained that in order to 
obtain the land for the project, the company bought off the same communal land parcels three or 
four different times due to the complicated land titling situation.69 For their part, local 
communities may view state institutions as too weak to meet their needs and instead may prefer 
to use direct interaction with companies to negotiate greater compensation .70 
In practice, EIA talleres have taken on a different function than that articulated in 
regulations and official resolutions. Instead of serving as opportunities to discuss technical 
aspects of the EIA, talleres have become as a hub for broader relations between communities and 
companies. The meetings serve as a space for mining companies to identify opposition to the 
project within communities and to buy off actors using gifts that may not relate to the EIA. In 
turn, talleres are an opportunity for community actors to make demands on companies. A 
consultant for mining dispute resolutions said in an interview that many local agreements 
resulting from the talleres are not documented at all—in the EIA or elsewhere.71 
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Beyond local communities is the “supracommunal” level.72 In supracommunal spaces, 
actors may have more organizational resources and be less willing to accept company pay-offs. 
The most vocal mobilization against mining company practices in Peru has come in the form of 
fronts (frentes), which consist of various civil society organizations and occasionally subnational 
government actors. For example, in the well-known case of conflict in the department of Piura 
involving the company Minera Majaza and the Río Blanco mining project (currently owned by 
Río Blanco Copper), provincial and district mayors, communities, and other groups, including 
other, existing frentes, joined to form the Frente por el Desarrollo Sostenible de la Frontera Norte 
in 2005 .73 
Within these supracommunal spaces, subnational governments do not simply respond to 
immediate popular complaints about mining practices. As Kent Eaton has noted in his research 
on “subnational economic nationalism” in Peru, subnational governments also are constrained by 
the need to bring in resources from the same private transnational actors that popular movements 
may oppose.74 Beyond the mining canon, described in Part II of this report, supracommunal 
actors may seek out resources from companies directly (similar to local dynamics). One example 
of such a direct transfer of resources to the supracommunal level is a development fund set up by 
the Swiss mining company Xstrata to channel resources toward areas in the vicinity of the Las 
Bambas mining project in the department of Apurímac. The company used the fund as a way to 
dissuade opposition by actors outside the immediate zone of extraction, in combination with 
direct relations with the most local communities. The main conflict in the area became the 
question of how the fondo de fideicomiso was to be spent, a conflict that played out, for instance, 
between the regional government of the Apurímac department and the provinces of Grau and 
Cotabambas within Apurímac.75  
A final subnational actor is the regional government, the territorial jurisdiction of which 
is the department. Like provincial and district governments, regional governments can find 
themselves caught between the pressures to respond to mobilization against a mining company’s 
practices (or planned practices) on one hand and to acquire campaign and development funds on 
the other hand. However, unlike lower levels of government, regional governments are the 
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logical next step towards aggregating different supracommunal interests, given that, as noted, 
frentes can bring together provincial and district mayors. In fact, regional presidents may find 
themselves competing with leaders of different frentes for popular political support, as we will 
see below in the case of the Conga mining project. Importantly, the regional level is also the last 
stop before the national level of government, which is consistently pro-mining.  
The following analysis will show how subnational EIA participation has proven more 
consequential than would be expected from a procedural element in a technical, centralized 
process. This report uses a path-dependent framework, whereby subnational debates taking place 
within and surrounding the EIA process serve as a “critical juncture,” potentially sending the 
EIA on a path toward national-level scrutiny, which can halt the project altogether.76 During the 
critical juncture, there may be considerable uncertainty, specifically because it is not 
predetermined which technical plans will be adopted or the extent to which communities will 
need to be appeased by mining companies. However, if company-community tension has not 
been resolved within the structure of the talleres and audiencia, backtracking proves hard, and 
later efforts to gain community approval are generally unsuccessful. The cases analyzed below 
will demonstrate that though subnational conflict may be spurred by technical characteristics of 
the EIA—along with complaints about the participatory processes—subsequent company efforts 
to address the technical concerns have proven insufficient to obtain subnational approval of the 
project and avoid greater scrutiny at higher levels.  
This report identifies two mechanisms by which subnational conflict in the EIA process 
can escalate. First, there is the issue of relations between local communities and companies 
during the EIA process, in which the local actors are included. Should those relations be tense, 
we observe the scaling up of opposition to the EIA and mining project altogether. Second, 
positive local community-company relations in the EIA process can trigger or reinforce 
opposition to the EIA and project among supracommunal actors left out of the EIA process. In 
both cases, mobilization can lead to the involvement of the regional government, which jumps on 
board when anti-EIA or anti-mining sentiment becomes strong within the department. Indeed, 
the pressures on regional governments have been so substantial that there is evidence that 
regional governments may be taking the lead in heading up EIA negotiations in a working group 
setting in order to preempt anti-mining mobilization. 
Case Selection 
This report is particularly concerned with events occurring after local EIA talleres and audiencias 
became standard practice. It focuses on three major conflicts mentioned frequently by interview 
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subjects around the mining projects of Conga, Tía María, and Quellaveco. The projects provide 
variation in the companies involved, the department’s mining history, the regional president’s 
political position toward mining, and the result of the project’s EIA process (see Table 1).77  
 
Table 1: The Mining Projects 






















EIA approved (2010); 
project paused (November 
2011); changes to EIA 
demanded (May 2012) 






EIA being developed within 
regional forum (March 
2011–present) 
 
The $4.8 billion Conga gold and copper mining project is in the department of 
Cajamarca, which has been heavily mined since the 1990s. Cajamarca’s regional president 
Gregorio Santos (2011–present) has a history of having union ties and touting anti-mining 
sentiments.78 Conga is owned by Yanacocha, which is controlled by Newmont (with 51 percent 
of shares) and in which the Peruvian company Buenaventura is an important partner (with 44 
percent of shares).79 Another large Yanacocha-owned gold mine in Cajamarca, which has been 
in production since the 1990s, has brought the company a poor reputation in terms of its social 
and environmental practices. One mining consultant said that Yanacocha’s approach has been 
the “old way,” without taking seriously community relations.80 Several interview subjects 
emphasized Buenaventura’s role, highlighting how, despite being a junior partner, the company 
has exceptional power in Yanacocha and in Peru’s mining ministry due to the influence of the 
owners, the Benavides family.81 
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Tía Maria and Quellaveco are mines in Peru’s dry south, where mining took root 
beginning in the 1950s.82 In Arequipa, home to the longstanding Cerro Verde mine, the $950 
million Tía María project has the potential to produce 120,000 tons of copper annually.83 Tía 
María is being pursued by Southern Copper, which was a U.S. company until Grupo México 
gained control of it in 1999. Southern is unique in that it managed to continue operating through 
Peru’s nationalization of mining in the 1970s. The company has operated in the departments of 
Tacna (the Cuajone mine) and Moquegua (the Toquepala mine) since the 1950s and 1970s, 
respectively84 and is known for neglecting the community relations dimension of mining.85 
Arequipa’s president Juan Manuel Guillén Benavides (2007–present) has been moderate and 
aligned with business and mining interests. However, as mayor of Arequipa, popular pressure 
pushed him to take the lead of a major antiprivatization movement (the Arequipazo, in 
opposition to electricity privatization) and then to head groups opposing the low tax rate granted 
to the private Cerro Verde mining company under his first administration as regional president.86 
Finally, the Quellaveco project, located in Moquegua between Cuajone and Toquepala, is 
expected to produce 225,000 tons of copper annually for 28 years.87 Quellaveco is owned by 
Anglo American, which, like Yanacocha, is one of the “new mining” companies investing in 
Peru since privatization. Yet unlike Yanacocha, Anglo American has a very positive reputation 
among mining experts for its approach to community relations. Moquegua’s regional president, 
Martín Vizcarra Cornejo (2011–present), has an engineering background and has been an ally of 
mining companies.88 
The EIA at the Local Level: a Political Process 
As a first step in exploring subnational EIA politics, we begin at the local level, with the highly 
political nature of the talleres and audiencias. These meetings often encompass broader 
company-community relations that can go beyond the EIA. 
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A glance at the Antamina case illustrates just how distant talleres can be from addressing 
EIA content. A former mining company official who had worked as a consultant for Compañía 
Minera Antamina (CMA) in the late 1990s described the audiencias that the company held in the 
zone of extraction, noting that in audiencias people not only discussed issues pertaining to the 
direct economic, environmental, or social effects of the mining project but also unrelated 
“pedidos,” or material demands, such as requests for infrastructure items such as bridges. 
Though he found these pedidos to be irrational and irrelevant to the EIA, he said that the 
conversations were useful for the company to hear about local demands and how to secure 
positive community relations so as to move forward with the mining project.89 
One major issue in the Antamina mining conflict was whether the company would 
construct either a highway or, alternatively, an underground pipeline to transport the minerals 
from the mining site in the inland district of San Marcos to the port city of Huarmey. While an 
environmental organization pressed for the underground pipeline, Huarmey residents sought a 
long-awaited highway that they hoped would provide employment for drivers, the development 
of businesses, and greater access to markets for farmers. At a 1999 company-led meeting in 
Huarmey, CMA described to local authorities and residents from Huarmey and surrounding 
areas the contributions the mine would make to socioeconomic development in the zone. 
Afterward, CMA provided the energy and mining ministry with the attendance list and 
characterized the meeting as having been about recent EIA modifications to introduce the 
pipeline plan. Citizens of Huarmey thought the company misrepresented the meeting, which they 
thought had nothing to do with the EIA. It was that misrepresentation that ultimately soured 
relations between CMA and the city.90 
Tía María: Local Opposition 
Tía María also shows how the local EIA process can mean something other than procedural, 
informative participation as outlined in the regulations. Opposition to the Tía María EIA 
intensified to such a degree that it proved impossible to hold the mandated audiencia, 
demonstrating how even satisfying the procedural requirements demand a substantial degree of 
cooperation of local communities with companies.91 
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Following some early and, according to mining officials interviewed, highly limited 
efforts to build positive relations with local communities near the Tambo River in Arequipa,92 
Southern held its first taller in November 2007 in Cocchacra, Islay, the location of the project.93 
During the drafting of the EIA, a second taller was held, and the final taller took place in July 
2009.94 A mining official highly knowledgeable about the case said that at all three talleres the 
company presented two options for obtaining water for the project: to draw water either from 
existing waterways or from underground water sources. He said that at the third and final taller, 
the company presented to communities another possibility, for the first time: to rely on sea water, 
using a desalination plant.95  
According to the mining company official, conflict over the project first emerged at the 
audiencia scheduled for August 2009, where the completed EIA was to be presented. The EIA 
outlined all three options, but it heavily favored using river water, which angered citizens who, 
by that point, expected the desalination project to go forward. A nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) official who moderates mining conflict depicted Southern Copper as having “lied” to the 
population by promising the desalination plant and then going back on its word.96 Before the 
company could present the EIA, attendees threw chairs and tried to stone mining officials, 
leading to police intervention that only fed the conflict. The audiencia was suspended due to the 
violence.97 Even the regional president, Juan Manuel Guillén—who, as discussed below, bent 
over backwards to make the project happen—asked in September 2009 that the company pursue 
the desalination plant option for the project.98  
Despite the opposition, Southern continued resisting the desalination plant option, 
claiming that it was not economically viable and citing electricity and construction costs. 
Southern hoped to convince the population of the technical viability of alternative means of 
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obtaining water for the project,99 but was unsuccessful: later that month, in a non-binding 
referendum in Cocachacra, 90 percent of participating voters opposed the project, which was 
also unpopular in surrounding voting districts.100  
All parties involved treated the subnational EIA process as critical and as a method of 
resolving the broader issue of the company’s social license to pursue the Tía María mining 
project. Vice Minister of Energy and Mines Fernando Gala expected Southern Copper to 
strengthen local relations in order to gain permission for the project.101 A mining company 
executive close to the case specified that the energy and mining ministry had asked the company 
to give radio presentations about the project, discuss the project on television, provide interviews 
to newspapers, and hold meetings with the public, all of which the company did.102  
These efforts, however, proved insufficient. After the original August audencia ended in 
violence, the required audiencia was repeatedly postponed and eventually cancelled in April 
2010 after an “indefinite strike” began in Islay in response to a letter from Southern to the 
DGAAM that stated that the Islay provincial mayor had declared the selected location for the 
audiencia to be unfit.103  
Conga: Supracommunal Opposition 
The case of Conga exemplifies the deep divisions that can exist between local and 
supracommunal actors in the EIA process and in mining conflicts more broadly. In particular, in 
the Conga case supracommunal actors opposed the project partly as a reaction to their exclusion 
from—and local actors’ inclusion in—the EIA process.  
The Conga EIA defines the immediate area of influence as encompassing 32 
communities located in the provinces of Cajamarca and Celendín. An official with the Office of 
Conflict Prevention under the President of the Council of Ministers said that there were three or 
four talleres in the area of influence during the EIA process.104 The talleres and the audiencia, 
held in the district of La Encañada in Cajamarca province, went smoothly. The EIA was 
approved in October 2010, and local approval was taken seriously; the regional vice president of 
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Newmont’s South America office acknowledged that the communities had some degree of EIA 
review authority, stating that the communities had “approved” the Conga EIA.105 
Not all residents in Cajamarca were as supportive of the project as those 32 communities. 
The main opposition to the EIA and to the Conga project more broadly has come from the 
districts of Huasmín and Sorochuco in Celendín.106 The Frente de Defensa Ambiental de 
Cajamarca, led by activist Wilfredo Saavedra, has proven particularly visible. Supracommunal 
actors initially opposed two central elements of the Conga EIA. On procedural grounds, they 
claimed that the EIA wrongly placed them outside the project’s area of direct influence and 
thereby excluded them from the talleres and audiencias, which should have been held in 
Huasmín and Sorochuco.107 In addition, activists simply did not believe the company would 
follow the technical procedures laid out in the study to address the project’s impact on four 
lagoons, which had been the central issue surrounding the EIA.108  
The March 2010 audiencia saw substantial opposition from these supracommunal actors 
(and not from the local actors who had been included in the EIA process).109 At the time, 
Yanacocha’s response to concern for the lagoons was that the company would construct four 
reservoirs to replace the water from the lagoons, and that doing so would provide three times 
more water for human consumption and agricultural needs than what was presently available.110 
Shortly thereafter, in May 2010, Cajamarca’s regional president Gregorio Santos met with 
Yanacocha officials, after which he proposed a revision of the EIA “so that the communities 
would calm down,” but the proposal was not taken seriously.111 
Subnational EIA Politics as a Critical Juncture 
In the cases of Tía María and Conga, subnational EIA politics served as a critical juncture that 
set these projects on a particular path; once on that path, it proved difficult for the mining 
company to reverse course. The following analysis will show how the initial conflicts over 
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technical aspects of the projects could have been addressed through stronger communication and, 
in the case of Tía María, technical adjustments to the project. However, when those issues were 
not resolved within the structure of the local EIA talleres and audiencias—or in the case of 
Conga, immediately afterward, through communications between the company and 
supracommunal actors—conflict escalated, and subsequent efforts on the part of the company to 
address the technical concerns proved fruitless. Ultimately, the EIAs received national and 
international scrutiny, with serious consequences for the projects. 
Tía María: Escalation from the Local Level 
Poor relations between Cocchacra and Southern Copper, combined with an EIA proposal that the 
community disliked on technical grounds, led to sufficient opposition to the mining project in 
Islay that subsequent company plans to adjust the EIA and satisfy the initial demand for a 
desalination plant failed to resolve the conflict. Shortly after the audiencia was canceled in April 
2010, Southern finally changed its position on the desalination plant. Hoping to reduce fears 
about water shortages, the company announced that the desalination plant was viable. The 
government put the project on hold for 90 days and formed a mesa de diálogo (roundtable) for 
the government and farmers to review the EIA and enable the project to move forward.112  
Neither the government’s efforts nor the company’s adoption of the desalination plant 
model reduced tensions, however. In November 2010, after Southern’s plan to spend $50 million 
on the desalination plant was publicized, protest in Islay broke out.113 Members of the Tambo 
Defense Front that brought together various groups opposed to the project interrupted a 
ceremony in which the vice minister of agriculture, along with the head of the national water 
authority, presented equipment valued at $1.2 million to the Tambo Agricultural Association. 
Protesters claimed that Southern had purchased the equipment in an attempt to buy farmers’ 
cooperation with the Tía María project.114 Days later Tambo Valley Defense Front leaders 
announced that they would restart their protests against Tía María, which triggered the national 
police to prepare to send 4,000 personnel to the zone. The Front’s president said, “We don’t want 
them to explain from where they will get the water, nor the technology that they will use to avoid 
pollution; we only want them to leave the valley and let us live peacefully.” He said that the 
protests would continue if the central government did not send a commission to Tambo to hold a 
popular referendum on the project.115 
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This local mobilization set in motion national and international processes that ultimately 
led to a rigorous examination of the EIA and the halting of the project. Amid protest against the 
project in late 2010, the energy and mining ministry contracted a team from the United Nations 
Office for Project Services (UNOPS) to review the Tía María EIA, a move that temporarily 
reduced protests.116 However, protest exploded again in mid-March 2011 when the report was 
leaked to the leader of the Tambo Defense Front. The report raised 138 problems with the EIA, 
including a lack of details on the desalination plant option. Through the end of March 2011, the 
energy and mining ministry’s response to protesters demanding the project’s termination was to 
suspend review of the EIA for 180 days.117 Protest against the project grew, and by early April 
three people had been killed and several others were in critical condition. Finally, in this context 
of violence, the energy and mining ministry canceled the project on the grounds that the EIA 
contained “unsalvageable elements.”118  
Conga: Escalation from the Supracommunal Level 
Like the Tía María case, subnational conflict over the Conga EIA intensified, closing off the 
possibility that technical solutions to protesters’ initial complaints could reduce tensions. In 
addition, Conga illustrates how subnational opposition to a mining project can be exacerbated by 
tensions between local communities that support the project, on one hand, and supracommunal 
actors pushing back against that support, on the other. 
After Newmont announced in July 2011 that Conga’s financing had been approved, 
opposition actors mobilized in the form of meetings and marches. In October 2011, protesters 
blocked an important highway in La Encañada, and over 2,000 people marched from the 
Huasmín district to the lagoons threatened by the project, demanding that Yanacocha remove 
company equipment from the zone within eight days. On November 2nd, the ministers of 
environment, agriculture, and energy and mines arrived at the project in an effort to address the 
conflict.119  
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In reaction to the protests, the environment ministry reviewed the EIA. The report, 
released on November 24, 2011, criticized the assessment on several grounds, including the 
EIA’s inappropriately narrow definition of the area of direct influence, and emphasized the 
adverse effects on the environment of the destruction of the lagoons. The scathing report 
contradicted an energy and mining ministry statement three days earlier that said the EIA “is 
correct and has the approval of the Ministry of Environment.”120 Conflict escalated, and in 
response to a government request, Yanacocha temporarily suspended the project.121 In 
December, amid increasing violence, the government declared a state of emergency and sent a 
national delegation to Cajamarca to resolve the conflict.  
The government’s delegation failed, and 10 ministers resigned.122 In late December, 
Cajamarca’s regional president, Gregorio Santos, declared the Conga project illegal on 
environmental grounds, arguing that the project would harm watersheds and pointing to a 
national law that prohibits mining in or around watersheds.123 During the “National March in 
Defense of Water” in February 2012, protesters marched nine days from Cajamarca to Lima in 
opposition to the Conga project.124 Though ultimately Peru’s constitutional tribunal nullified 
Santos’ declaration on the grounds that the regional president had no legal jurisdiction in the 
large- or medium-scale mining sectors,125 opposition leaders in Cajamarca, including Saavedra 
and Santos, continued trying to stop the project, threatening an indefinite regional strike if the 
national government had not canceled the project by the end of May 2012.126 The MINEM hired 
consultants to review the EIA, and in response to the content of the report, the government 
demanded that Yanacocha revise its plans for the project, including its plans for two of the four 
lagoons in question.127 
During the conflict, the opposing positions of the local and supracommunal actors, 
including Saavedra and Santos, hardened. In December 2011, 93 community leaders attended a 
mesa de diálogo with representatives of the national government, in which attendees discussed 
the terms of the international consultants’ EIA review. Following the meeting, which Santos 
refused to attend, the public prosecutor of the campesino community of Sorochuco said that 
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Santos was unwilling to recognize the high level of support for the project among communities 
in Conga’s area of direct influence.128  
As opposition to Conga grew, it moved beyond the technical realm. As noted by mining 
conflict analyst Javier Torres, there was a strong consensus among all factions that water 
availability must be guaranteed and that Yanacocha’s reservoir plan would not meet those 
needs.However, Torres also emphasized that, even if the technical problems were resolved, 
Yanachocha lacks the necessary legitimacy in Cajamarca to develop the Conga operation; 
residents simply do not trust the company’s promises.129 President Santos himself has 
emphasized that irrespective of any potential technical solutions that Yanacocha may put forth, 
the conflict had intensified to the point where the company simply could not obtain the “social 
license” for Conga: “Now the Yanacocha problem has become a theme of consent and social 
license. That is the fundamental problem…The people don’t want Yanacocha to expand. It 
doesn’t matter what experts may come, whatever happens [the people] won’t want [the 
expansion].”130 
In summary, this analysis has shown that despite fairly lax regulations, Peru’s local EIA 
process carries real political importance. In each of the two cases analyzed, subnational actors 
opposed both the EIA’s content and the process by which subnational actors were included (and 
excluded). Subnational spaces for the EIA to be discussed served as a window of opportunity, 
and once that window was closed, the EIA and the project at large faced greater scrutiny by 
experts at the national level. 
The Rising Importance of Regional Governments 
A recurring theme that arises in both the Tía María and Conga cases is the pressure that 
subnational conflict has placed on regional governments. This final section highlights how 
Presidents Guillén and Santos of Arequipa and Cajamarca, respectively, positioned themselves 
against the projects in important ways in response to popular pressures from below. I then 
discuss a third case, that of Anglo American’s Quellaveco project in Moquegua, to illustrate how 
one regional president has led a region-level initiative to shape the EIA, thereby preempting local 
and supracommunal conflict against the EIA and the mining project more generally. These cases 
reveal that subnational EIA processes—which formally emphasize the local level, at the actual 
mining site—in fact have brought in supracommunal actors and thereby have made the regional 
government an increasingly important player in mining politics in Peru. 
Opposition to Tía María at the local level translated into the project’s absolute lack of 
legitimacy, as Southern could not even gain the support of the people residing in the immediate 
zone of extraction. Ultimately, massive protest forced the pro-mining regional government, 80 
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percent of which was funded by the mining canon, to oppose the EIA, though regional President 
Guillén tried to salvage the project even after the outbreak of violence. For example, after the 
UNOPS’ scathing report on the EIA was leaked in late March 2011, Guillén proposed 
establishing a regional ordinance that would downplay mining and emphasize agriculture and 
industry as the main economic activities in Arequipa in an effort to reduce conflict over Tía 
María,.131 Not until April 2011, when conflict peaked, did the president finally ask for the first 
time that the project be canceled.132  
In contrast to Guillén, Cajamarca’s President Santos consistently took anti-mining 
positions and, unsurprisingly, opposed the Conga EIA since the conflict began. According to 
Santos, he took the stance that Yanacocha’s plan for the lagoons was unacceptable shortly after 
his May 2010 meeting with company officials about the EIA.133 Nonetheless, as noted by Javier 
Torres, the consolidation and radicalization of the anti-Conga position in Cajamarca has been 
driven more by political competition between politicians seeking support—specifically, between 
President Santos and activists Marco Arana and Wilfredo Saavedra—than by substance.134 
Therefore, even in Cajamarca we see how the regional government has responded to bottom-up 
political pressures to address complaints about EIAs and subnational EIA participatory 
processes. 
In terms of regional governments’ roles in the EIA process, Anglo American’s 
Quellaveco project in Moquegua stands out as a key case: Moquegua’s regional president has led 
a collaborative initiative to revise the EIA at the regional level, an effort that has preempted 
massive mobilization and moved the mining project forward. Initially Southern had owned the 
concession, which was located between its mines in Tacna and Moquegua.135 Anglo American 
then acquired the Quellaveco concession from the Peruvian government in 1992.136 The region’s 
history of mining and local frustration with the resultant pollution have made communities in the 
vicinity of Quellaveco wary of the mining project, which is still in its early stages due to 
opposition.137  
As in the Tía María and Conga cases, the issue surrounding the Quellaveco project 
consistently has been the question of water. Anglo American’s initial plan involved drawing 
underground water, constructing a dam, and implementing an irrigation system.138 Following 
                                                
131 La República, “Caso Tía María: Autoridades dejarían de lado a la minería.”  
132 El Comercio, “Presidente regional de Arequipa pidió cancelar proyecto Tía María,” April 7, 2011. 
133 Romo Espinoza, “Gregorio Santos sobre Conga.”  
134 Javier Torres, “Conga: ¿Batalla final?” 
135 According to a private consultant in the mining industry who worked with Southern during the 1980s, Southern 
surrendered Quellaveco to the government during the mining nationalizations in the 1970s as a way for Southern to 
maintain ownership of Toquepala and Cuajone. Maiah Jaskoski, interview, Lima, Peru, March 22, 2012. 
136 Arellano Yanguas, ¿Minería sin fronteras? 152. 
137 Ibid..  
138 The information on Quellaveco in this section was provided by a mining company official with close knowledge 




company communications with the central government, the Quellaveco EIA was approved in 
2000 prior to political decentralization, but in June 2002, popular pressure led the central 
government to instruct Anglo American to revisit the EIA, blocking the company from obtaining 
formal water rights for the project. In late 2002 company representatives met with the newly 
elected regional president, who had commissioned an independent study of the water issues. 
When the study proved inconclusive, the company paused its efforts. 
In 2008, Anglo American began working on a new plan to use existing river water and to 
construct a dam that would increase available surface water. The energy and mining ministry 
approved revisions to the project’s EIA in 2010,139 but local opposition to the project continued. 
When the company presented the EIA revisions to the central government, it also began 
compensation negotiations with the Moquegua regional government in exchange for permission 
to develop the project.140 Nevertheless, ongoing conflict with residents of Moquegua again 
blocked the project at the water-permit stage. 
Beginning in March 2011, Moquegua’s new regional president convened a regional 
“mesa de trabajo” that brought together various government, company, and civil-society actors in 
Moquegua to resolve the water issues and move the project forward. Between March 2011 and 
January 2012, the mesa met 12 times and proved so successful that in March 2012 the national 
government began participating, and an energy and mining ministerial resolution formally made 
the mesa de trabajo a “mesa de diálogo.”141 Experts on mining conflict knowledgeable about 
Quellaveco—including researchers, independent consultants, and private company officials—
widely viewed the regional government’s efforts as highly effective in bringing different actors 
together for real debate. According to a mining official close to the case, these regional 
discussions led Anglo American to adjust its original plan for the dam such that it would provide 
more than double the water initially planned.142  
VI. BOLIVIA: SUBSTANTIVE LOCAL STRUCTURES THAT SEAL OUT 
PROJECT OVERSIGHT 
In contrast to the Peruvian case, communities in Bolivia’s Chaco region have focused on 
compensation for new projects’ unquantifiable effects rather than on potential oversight of or 
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adjustments to technical elements of the projects themselves. In explaining this dynamic, this 
analysis emphasizes the importance of the regulatory instruments governing the consulta previa 
in the Bolivian hydrocarbon sector, the role of the Bolivian state in the hydrocarbon industry, 
and a structural characteristic of the gas projects: that there was no obvious identifiable technical 
“fix.”  
This analysis draws on interviews conducted in La Paz and Santa Cruz about gas 
conflicts involving the Guaraní, organized under the APG, in the Chaco region. First it argues 
that companies have considered Bolivia’s consulta previa a major hurtle to project development. 
Public companies, which have become increasingly important in recent years, have been 
particularly resistant to the consulta—a troubling development given the state’s historical lack of 
attention to company-community relations in extraction zones. Second, the analysis demonstrates 
that in spite of the fact that the Guaraní are “most likely” to have capacity to raise technical 
issues given their organizational strength and resources and supplemented by outside technical 
support, there has not been a single technical issue that has been both a primary focus of 
complaints and viewed as easily fixable through technical alterations. Third, the analysis 
describes three cases in which the Guaraní used direct action to initiate the consulta process, 
which then remained at the local level and ultimately focused heavily on compensation. 
Conflict to Initiate Consulta 
For companies, especially the state YPFB subsidiaries (which have served as the state partner in 
joint ventures since nationalization), the consulta process is viewed as a major barrier to moving 
projects forward, and as a result the companies tend to look for loopholes and ways to avoid the 
consulta process. Communities in the Chaco have therefore had to mobilize at the early stages in 
new projects in order to pressure the state to begin the consulta process at all. While the 2007 
regulations have added structure to negotiations between communities and companies and have 
changed the forms of compensation, communication between companies and communities has 
often required significant pressure from the latter. 
At a higher level, starting in the 1990s—during Bolivia’s natural gas boom and when 
private companies dominated the sector—the international community in the form of 
international financiers of private gas projects, specifically, the U.S. Government’s Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the World Bank, has also pressured companies to 
obtain a social license before operating in a given area in Bolivia since the late 1990s, according 
to a former employee of private hydrocarbon companies that spanned the extraction and 
transport sectors.143 She said that the World Bank exercised true oversight of these local 
communications with communities. 
                                                




In spite of these pressures, consultations in the last two decades have hardly resulted in 
arrangements that could be considered “fair” for Guaraní communities. A former private sector 
official said that when private companies entered the Chaco to begin projects in the late 1990s, 
they encountered communities that did not even know where to begin to ask for compensation 
for the projects. She gave an example of the Transboliviano pipeline, which runs to Brazil, 
constructed by an Enron-Shell consortium in that period. She said that company employees 
entered the territory and began conversations about compensation with community members, but 
people in the area did not know what the company meant by compensation. They would ask for 
sums of roughly $100, and the company would pay it. She explained that compensation was 
unknown before privatization; previously, the state was the only actor engaged in hydrocarbon 
projects, and would therefore enter and do projects without offering anything directly to 
communities in return. 
International pressures were insufficient to ensure that companies addressed community 
demands fairly. As of the early 2000s, the common pattern was that direct action by 
communities—usually blockades or occupation of new projects to halt their progress—was 
necessary to pressure private companies into engaging in negotiations over compensation. 
Interview subjects across the board—from the private sector to YPFB to NGO representatives to 
indigenous activists and experts on the consulta—confirmed this, and company officials 
emphasized the high cost of these mobilizations, which meant paying subcontractors who 
remained on standby. In response to such mobilizations, companies generally chose to pay 
communities off through direct negotiations.  
The introduction of the consulta process, which formally grants communities a say in 
approving new projects, has made companies even more resistant to engaging with communities. 
Not only is the communication process higher stakes, but as a result of nationalization, the 
companies are now state-led consortiums. This means that the state has had to engage in 
negotiations with communities regarding gas extraction for the first time, both in the form of the 
energy ministry, which leads the consulta, and through the YPFB corporations, which attend the 
consulta and have new interest in and responsibility for making progress on new projects. Intense 
company resistance to the consulta explains why, in the cases described below, popular 
mobilization has continued to be necessary to begin the consulta process. 
A former executive who had worked in the gas transportation sector, both in a private 
company and then in the newly nationalized YPFB Transportes, illustrated plainly the ineptitude 
of the state in communicating with communities about new projects within the consulta 
framework.144 When discussing the changes that resulted from the 2007 regulations, she said that 
it transferred responsibility for developing relations with communities from the companies to the 
state, particularly the hydrocarbon ministry. She explained that the ministry had no knowledge of 
                                                




projects nor any understanding of the details of a given EIA as it was still the private partner that 
had mastery of the technical elements of projects. Furthermore, she noted that the ministry had 
no knowledge of how to interact with communities, a skill that private companies had mastered 
to some degree or another.  
She explained how the state’s inability to carry out consultas eventually led to the reentry 
of the private sector in the negotiation process for new gas projects. From 2007 through 2009, 
private companies were not invited to the meetings during the consultation process. This proved 
unworkable; the private companies themselves began arguing that the process was failing to 
provide the social license for projects. Yet another critical factor, she said, was that YPFB had 
started conducting its own projects, whereupon it realized the mistakes incorporated into the 
laws. Due to nationalization in 2006, YPFB was a corporation and therefore had to maneuver the 
laws from the company side, but YPFB did not have the skills to operate in the consulta or 
interact with communities.145 As a result of YPFB’s ineptitude in engaging in the consulta, 
YPFB and private companies have adjusted the process. Companies are now usually allowed to 
attend consulta meetings so as to help present the EIA and answer questions.146  
It is not surprising, then, that it has been YPFB that has sought most aggressively to avoid 
the consultation process altogether, though as shown below, the private sector also has preferred 
to circumvent the regulations where possible. 
Lack of Obvious, Alterable Technical Issue 
While many project aspects were identified as being highly worrisome environmentally and 
culturally, there were no cases where a single issue was overwhelmingly the most obvious 
problem, and where, in addition, the issue had an obvious solution, visible to non-experts, that 
would avoid major, adverse environmental and social effects while also allowing the project to 
go forward. This structural element of the projects themselves has meant that popular 
mobilization surrounding the project, which was already oriented toward achieving negotiations 
to begin with, has not turned to focus on technical aspects of the project. 
The Guaraní would seem well positioned to have the capacity to recognize basic 
technical challenges and solutions surrounding hydrocarbon projects, to the extent that it is 
possible for a group of non-experts (in hydrocarbon matters) to do so. The Guaraní, organized 
under the APG, are really a “most likely case” for having access to basic technical 
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understandings of projects, given their substantial organizational resources and supplementary 
outside support. This section describes these resources, and in particular the training of APG 
“técnicos,” networks developed within the APG to distribute lessons learned from prior gas 
projects, and ongoing technical support from outside consultants. However, as this discussion 
will demonstrate, there are limitations to these support factors: gas projects are simply too 
complex for even the APG to recognize the correct technical solution to given project challenges. 
Beginning in the late 1990s, members of the CIDOB, including the APG, received 
technical training in monitoring projects and in negotiating and resolving conflicts, according to 
multiple indigenous group members who have participated in consultations.147 Though the 
training was funded by the World Bank, it built on experiences of the Mojeño, an indigenous 
group in the Bolivian department of Bení, which mobilized against Repsol’s investment in 
TIPNIS in 1998.148 The CIDOB and the Mojeños acquired substantial experience in and 
knowledge of carrying out consultas. Supported by CIDOB funds, the Mojeños worked with the 
APG to share their experience of the consulta previa concept with other indigenous groups. 
In 1999, a World Bank project funded by the Canadian government built on these 
foundations to develop a program to provide comprehensive training in conflict resolution and 
technical matters, including in the consulta. The program, implemented by the Canadian firm E2, 
reached five groups, or “regionales,” under the CIDOB. To illustrate how effective the training 
was, one interview subject named several current leaders in Bolivia’s national legislature and at 
the highest levels of the CIDOB who had gained their political skills and technical knowledge 
through the E2 training as part of the original group of “técnicos” trained through the program.149 
The World Bank project lasted until 2002.  
With this training in the consulta concept as a baseline, the APG has continued 
supporting the training of small technical teams to deal with land use issues. They have received 
some assistance from local and international NGOs as well as from independent consultants and 
lawyers sponsored by international entities—including the United Nations and foreign 
government agencies—and from companies, in the form of indigenous monitoring funds 
established for new projects as part of the community negotiation process.  
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Though permanent consultant staffs have been lean, and interviews suggest that outside 
support has dwindled in recent years,150 the networks and organization of these técnicos remains 
impressive. A current employee of YPFB with extensive experience working in consultas and in 
indigenous land rights issues, both in and out of government, said in an interview that the 
técnicos, and especially outside consultants, are critical players in consultas, and that in most 
consultas, there is an outside consultant.151 In terms of permanent técnicos, within the APG, each 
of the 27 communities that is more affected by extractive projects has técnicos in “natural 
resources and environment.” These teams are lean, and the técnicos are generalists who are 
expected to manage all issues regarding environmental questions; they are not consulta 
specialists per se. In addition, they rotate to help other communities in the APG, according to the 
APG técnico whom I interviewed, as well as a CIDOB member working on questions of the 
consulta.152 According to that same CIDOB representative, there has been an diffusion of 
knowledge across indigenous communities, which learn from others’ experiences to develop 
positions on potential problem areas. For example, after learning of projects where there were 
long-lasting environmental problems, such as when drilling or seismic explosions take place near 
a water source, groups started demanding in consultas that water sources be protected.  
Critically, even though indigenous groups were given intense support that should enable 
them to grasp technical elements and costs of projects and training in negotiating solutions, 
actually debating the technical dimensions remained impossible. There was widespread 
agreement among interview subjects about the lack of focus on technical aspects of projects 
during trainings, leaving the indigenous groups unable to recognize the scope of the technical 
challenges or to negotiate optimal solutions.  
Multiple interview subjects explained that the projects were too complicated for real 
technical debates to take place in the consulta setting. One representative of an international 
NGO working on issues pertaining to megaprojects as they affect the CIDOB said that projects 
generally involve extraction, transportation, and complicated technical issues at every step.153 A 
lawyer and former consultant for indigenous groups during conflicts in the 1990s in the Chaco 
described what he considered a typical case: in the late 1990s, a project involved the construction 
of a new gas pipeline near a river used heavily for fishing by the Guanayek community in Villa 
Monte. There was a question about whether to construct the pipeline above or underneath the 
river, but as the consultant explained, his team lacked the expertise necessary to evaluate which 
option was the best in terms of avoiding contamination of the water. 
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151 Maiah Jaskoski, interview, Santa Cruz, Bolivia, September 5, 2012. 
152 Maiah Jaskoski, interviews, Santa Cruz, Bolivia, September 4 and 6, 2012. 




A CIDOB representative provided another example of the complicated nature of these 
issues. There is strong demand within indigenous communities for companies to deal with 
pasivos, which are areas of past extraction that seemed stable at the project’s conclusion but later 
cause serious problems for the community. He explained that it can be hard to tell if there are gas 
leaks that could contaminate water tables at the conclusion of drilling. Because the Chaco is very 
dry, it is only after the rare heavy rains that gas can overflow and spread, leading to 
contamination. This contamination, then, may not be evident until long after the project has 
concluded. 
When technical dimensions are discussed in the consulta, they led to very small changes 
at most, and the debates themselves are focused on very minor project changes. The lawyer 
referenced above said that throughout discussions in the 1990s, his team was not able to change 
the location of seismic explosions.154 Others, with experience working in consultas since the 
regulations were passed, said that changes have been made, but that they have been very 
minimal. The most common changes achieved have been small deviations in original plans for 
gas duct routes in order to avoid passing through spiritual spaces in communities.155 The CIDOB 
representative also noted that in some cases plans were changed so as not to drill or conduct 
seismic explosions too close to specific water sources, but this was not always possible, as noted 
above.156 In one 2007 consulta case, the indigenous communities achieved a guarantee that there 
would be no explosions in “critical zones;” equally significantly, they increased the standard 
distance between explosions and water sources by 20 percent.157  
 
The Cases 
Resource conflict involving the Guaraní has been analyzed in depth elsewhere.158 The goal of 
this analysis is to review some central conflicts that have played out since the passage of the 
2007 regulations. The following three cases will illustrate how companies, and especially YPFB, 
have resisted the consulta to the point of defining projects outside the purview of the consulta 
regulations. This avoidance, in conjunction with the structural characteristic of gas projects—
                                                
154 Maiah Jaskoski, interview, Santa Cruz, Bolivia, September 4, 2012. 
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which lack an obvious, reparable technical problem—has meant that the major focus of 
community mobilization in these cases has been to force the state to initiate the consulta process. 
This starting point, combined with regulations that encourage all substantive project issues to be 
addressed within the consulta framework, has meant that the debate in the consulta itself has 
focused not on technical characteristics of the projects but rather on compensation. 
 These three cases involve APG communities in the Chaco region and were described in 
an interview with a técnico who has been working in the APG for 25 years, specifically on issues 
of consultation since the late 1990s.159 These cases describe conflicts over new projects, two in 
Santa Cruz and one in Tarija, since the 2007 regulations were ratified. By way of background, 
the Chaco region crosses into Tarija as well as Chuquisaca and Santa Cruz. The conflicts involve 
the Guaraní communities of Takovo Mora and Yaku Igua, in Santa Cruz, two of 27 communities 
organized under the APG.  
As subsidiary groups within the APG, the two communities enjoy the resources of the 
APG technical team, which is trained in consultations, as well as support from networks of 
leaders and técnicos that have shared experiences and knowledge to facilitate a greater 
understanding of threats and possible alternatives with regard to new gas projects (see above). 
The two communities are highly affected by gas extraction. The Takovo Mora TCO (originary 
communal lands, tierra comunitaria de origen, TCO—that is, lands that are legally communally 
owned) encompasses five oil fields. This situation has meant that APG técnicos focus more on 
Takovo Mora (as well as on the other APG TCOs with intensive extraction).160 Finally, as noted 
below in the case analysis, Takovo Mora, independent of the CIDOB or the APG, in fact has 
been highly effective in holding up projects due to its organization and extensive knowledge of 
regulations. 
As a final introductory note about the cases, two of them involve the question of land 
surveying (“saneamiento”). In Bolivia, the bureaucratic and resource hurdles to surveying have 
meant that property lines and territorial boundaries are highly uncertain for many indigenous 
communities. In fact, the demand for saneamiento has been so central that it has been included in 
compensation packages during hydrocarbon conflict. A former employee of the Enron-Shell 
consortium that constructed the Gas Transboliviano pipeline to Brazil in 1997 explained that the 
final development plan, valued at around $5 million and agreed to by the affected indigenous 
communities, included the surveying and titling of land. The company worked with INRA (the 
government’s national agrarian reform institute, Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria) and 
local representatives to complete the surveying, resulting in the first titling of land for Bolivian 
TCOs. 
 
                                                
159 Maiah Jaskoski, interview with APG técnico, Santa Cruz, September 6, 2012. 





Percheles and El Dorado Gas Fields (Santa Cruz, community of Takovo Mora): August 2007–
October 2008 
Shortly after the passage of the 2007 regulations for the consultation in hydrocarbons (Supreme 
Decree 29033, February 16, 2007), the private company Chaco pursued several projects to 
develop the Percheles and El Dorado gas fields.161 Two of those projects were within the Takovo 
Mora TCO: seismic studies and the construction of gas lines. The other projects were well 
perforations, to be made outside of indigenous territory, and the Perchele plant, bordering the 
TCO. A former employee of Chaco, who had worked in the company at the time, noted that this 
project marked the start of ministerial involvement in conflict cases, but only as a result of the 
initial conflict itself; indigenous groups, she said, were so highly attuned to the regulatory 
changes that they used the regulations to ensure that the state was involved.162 
This case shows how Bolivian lowland indigenous groups have had to navigate the larger 
national political landscape in order to have their demands met. At the time of the conflict, the 
APG was aligned with the national government of Evo Morales, which supported Chaco’s 
projects and has been a staunch supporter of gas development in the Chaco region more broadly. 
Because of this alliance, the APG did not participate in the conflict, and in fact broke with the 
Takovo Mora community entirely, stating publicly that the APG would resolve the issue through 
talks with the government. The alliance between the APG and the government meant that no 
public, anti-government statements were made in the press and that Takovo Mora was left on its 
own to push for the full consulta process. 
In accordance with the environmental law, Takovo Mora learned of the projects when 
Chaco entered Takovo Mora territory without permission to get sand for the Percheles plant 
construction in August 2007. In response, the Takovo Mora community, along with campesinos 
and the local municipality of Cabaza, blocked the plant for several months. The municipality sent 
a letter of complaint to the company (Chaco), as Chaco had also crossed municipal boundaries 
without permission to collect the sand. The groups also denounced the trespassing to the ministry 
of environment, which responded by insisting that the company should have consulted with the 
local communities as well as the municipality. On September 8, 2007, there was a meeting 
between community leaders and the company, at which time the company acknowledged the two 
projects that were located in indigenous territory.  
Subsequently, the consulta process was followed from December 2007 into February 
2008. In all, the process involved over 100 meetings, some of which lasted 48 hours. Takovo 
Mora led the negotiations, though the campesinos and the municipal mayor’s office were also 
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involved in the process. Once the final “acta” for the consulta was signed in February 2008, 
Chaco was able to obtain the environmental license. At that point, negotiations began over the 
question of compensation, which ultimately came in the form of a social investment plan 
consisting of $300,000 per year for five years, to be divided among the three groups (the 
indigenous community, the campesinos, and the municipality). In addition, a development plan 
and a fund for indigenous monitoring of the project were established. 
Within APG communities the case is viewed as a success due to the cooperation of the 
indigenous community, the municipality, and the campesino community; their ability to force the 
company to participate in a true consulta through the successful complaint process; and the size 
of the compensation package. 
Rio Grande Plant (September 2011–April 2012) 
A second conflict, which also involved the Takovo Mora community, was also referenced by 
multiple interview subjects. In this case, YPFB was interested in developing an oil field that was 
located entirely within indigenous land. In addition to being a high profile, intense conflict, this 
case also demonstrates the complex issue of land ownership and titling. Further, in contrast to 
Percheles, the considerable press coverage was fundamental in pressuring the ministry of 
hydrocarbons to initiate and lead the consulta. In terms of indigenous organization, the APG 
again proved unhelpful, splitting from the Takovo Mora and claiming that the APG would work 
the issue out directly with the government. However, Takovo Mora did receive support from the 
CIDOB. 
Though the conflict took place in 2011 and 2012, the issue of land rights and the 
uncertainty surrounding ownership of the land on which YPFB plant was constructed stretches 
back much further. According to the APG expert, based on surveying of the area, INRA 
concluded in 2005 that 100 percent of the oil field was inside indigenous land. Later that same 
year, a private company (Andina S.A.) filed a complaint that the land be reassessed, claiming 
that in fact it owned 20 hectares within that area. INRA changed its assessment, granting the 
company the 20 hectares. After what the APG expert described as “irregular” decisions by INRA 
in 2008 and 2010, and running counter to Takovo Mora’s understanding that 230 hectares were 
going to remain with the community, the ministry of rural development and lands in August 
2011 (Supreme Resolution 05788) in which it declared that 201 hectares would go to YPFB, 21 
hectares to Andina, and 76 hectares to Takovo Mora. 
YPFB initially treated the land as belonging to Takovo Mora, approaching the 
community to establish a meeting to set up the process for the consulta in mid-2011. In 
September, before the consultation meetings had even begun, YPFB decided to move forward 
with the project without waiting for approval from Takovo Mora in spite of a prior YPFB-
Takovo Mora agreement, overseen by the hydrocarbons ministry, that YPFB would wait for an 




At that point YPFB “militarized the plant,” in the words of the APG expert. The military 
was present as the company cleared 11 hectares of land to construct the plant. Still engaged 
elsewhere, Takovo Mora submitted a complaint to the environment ministry on September 11th. 
On October 7th, the hydrocarbon minister came to the zone and signed an act that the consulta 
would begin, which happened on October 10th. The final “acta” that would conclude the consulta 
was expected to be signed at a November 11th meeting. At that meeting, Takovo Mora asked for 
the land ownership question to be clarified. In particular, Takovo Mora viewed the land, though 
not fully surveyed, as belonging to Takovo Mora, and that after the project was completed the 
land would revert back to the community. This view conflicted with the above-mentioned 
supreme resolution of August 2011. 
Even though the final acta had not in fact been signed and thus the consulta had not been 
concluded, YPFB issued a public announcement that the consulta had been finalized 
successfully, and in December 2011 the company was granted the environmental license for the 
project. In January, perhaps recognizing their mistake, the company contradicted itself and stated 
that a consulta was not required, on the grounds that the land was not in fact indigenous land. 
In January 2012, the hydrocarbon ministry invited Takovo Mora to a meeting to discuss 
the issue. When the ministry representative failed to show after 24 hours, the community 
resolved to occupy the plant, which they did, beginning on January 16th. The community 
controlled the plant for almost three weeks. In spite of a visit by the hydrocarbon ministry, no 
progress was made. Finally, in late January, the new hydrocarbon minister signed the act to 
initiate the consulta. The final agreement ending the consulta process was signed February 2nd, 
and on April 10th, the agreement regarding compensation was signed for 7 million bolivianos 
(approximately $1 million).  
This case illustrates clearly just how important the procedures of the consulta have been 
for indigenous communities and for the pattern of conflict itself. The environment ministry, 
which had granted the environmental license to YPFB on the same day that the community took 
over the plant, denied the Takovo Mora’s request to nullify the environmental license. Within 
one sector of the Takovo Mora community, there existed a strong preference not to re-inaugurate 
the consulta, because the environmental license had been granted prior to the signing of the 
consulta acta, which went against the legal structures of the consulta. The division over whether 
or not to agree to engage in the consulta after the environmental license was granted created 
tension within the Takovo Mora community that continued throughout the negotiations and 




YPFB Liquid Separation Plant in Yacuiba(November 2011–present)163  
The third and final conflict case is ongoing, and provides further evidence of how YPFB has 
sought to define projects outside the purview of the consulta regulations to avoid engaging in 
conversations with affected communities at all. This case also raises the issue of land ownership. 
The project, which is estimated to cost $700 million, would entail the construction of a plant to 
separate liquid gas. According to the APG técnico, a consulta process began on November 25, 
2011, when communities and leaders were invited to a meeting. Ten days later, however, the 
hydrocarbon ministry declared that the project no longer required a consulta because the project 
was actually a Category II project instead of Category I, implying that the project was less 
harmful to the environment than initially believed and placing it outside of the requirement for 
consulta. According to the técnico, the reclassification did not involve the scientific analysis 
required for categorizing projects; that more rigorous analysis had been used, she said, when the 
project initially was determined to be a Category I.164 Alongside the declaration that the project 
no longer required a consulta due to its technical specifications, the ministry claimed that the 
affected land did not in fact belong to the Yaku Igua (or to any other indigenous group), and for 
that reason, too, there was no need to consult with indigenous groups. The environmental 
ministry agreed with the hydrocarbon ministry’s decision.  
 This decision was disputed in Yacuiba, the center of the Yaku Igua TCO, and in late 
August 2012, the indigenous community took the land, paralyzing the project. As of early 
September, the ministries had not sent officials to discuss the issue with the indigenous 
community. There was a general APG mobilization event planned for September 10th; as part of 
this, the Yacuibe case was to be protested. As of September 11, according to the CIDOB website, 
the route between Yacuiba and Santa Cruz was being blocked to oppose the governments failure 
to comply with agreements, including the lack of a consulta in Yacuiba, the failure to address 
environmental harm from past projects in the Aguarague Park, and the failure to adequately 
survey Guaraní TCOs.165  
CONCLUSION 
To summarize, this report has sought to explain the different dynamics and outcomes of resource 
conflict in critical extractive industries in Peru and Bolivia. In both countries there are tensions in 
zones of extraction between, on one hand, a strong interest in protecting the environment and 
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communities’ livelihoods, health, and cultural practices; and, on the other hand, receiving 
investment through the mining and hydrocarbon sectors via the distribution of royalties and 
direct company investment in resource-rich zones. In this context, in the Peruvian cases, mining 
conflict stemming from community complaints about technical dimensions of projects has 
escalated to the point of triggering outside oversight and sometimes the cancellation of projects. 
In contrast, in the Bolivian hydrocarbon cases analyzed here, conflict revolved around achieving 
dialogue with the state and companies and obtaining compensation for projects. 
This analysis has observed, surprisingly, that participatory procedures that lack “teeth” to 
shape a project may in fact have more influence in affecting the substance and technical review 
of projects than structures that grant communities a say in whether or not new projects go 
forward. For Peru, the report has shown how the EIA has become a highly political process in 
which subnational actors prove central in developing and approving the EIA and, ultimately, the 
mining project—in spite of regulations that formally limit local participation to empty 
procedures. More than just a technical assessment, the EIA process is really a political institution 
that encompasses much of the political relations between mining companies, local communities, 
and subnational governments. Subnational political dynamics surrounding the EIA in fact can 
serve as a critical juncture in determining national-level dynamics surrounding the project. In 
Bolivia, in contrast, regulations give communities a substantive say in the fate of new projects, 
and influence in the process by which those projects are evaluated. However, by granting such 
substantive power to communities, those regulations ultimately have helped to limit the scrutiny 
of projects on technical grounds, due to the limited technical expertise available to communities 
and companies’ unwillingness to engage in the process from the start.  
A key structural factor has also been emphasized. In Peru, the projects noted here had the 
potential to divert critical water sources away from communities and toward the mining project, 
and yet there were clear technical solutions to this issue: companies could build desalination 
plants, dams, or reservoirs to offset the loss of water. In Peru, then, groups could mobilize 
against an obvious technical problem while knowing that the company could address the issue 
and continue the project, bringing necessary investment to the region. In contrast, in Bolivia’s 
natural gas cases, no single technical problem acted as a central rallying issue; the more 
complicated nature of gas extraction left communities unfocused and unable to demand the 
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW SUBJECTS IN PERU AND BOLIVIA, 2012 
Category Lima, Peru  
March 18–30 
La Paz and Santa Cruz, Bolivia 
August 27–September 7 
Total 
Researchers, journalists 9 7 16 
Mining/hydrocarbon sector 7 5 12 
Conflict expert-practitioner 2 4 6 
Government official 2 4 6 
Indigenous activist* 0 1 1 
Total 20 21 41 
*Members of indigenous groups interviewed for their technical knowledge of the consulta previa were 
classified in the “conflict expert-practitioner” category. 
 
 
